



INDO-US RELATIONS SINCE 1971

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This is to certify that the work embodied in this dissertation entitled "INDO-US RELATIONS SINCE 1971" is the original work of the candidate, Mr. RAMESH PRASAD SINGH, and is suitable for submission for the award of a Ph.D. Degree in Political Science of the University of Allahabad. The candidate has fulfilled the requirements of attendance and stay.


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PREFACE

The pattern of Indo-US relations since 1971 was determined on the one hand by specific differences in perception or disagreements on a range of issues, the most crucial of which are being examined in the thesis, and on the other by the global scenario of super-power polarisation. Despite serious divergences and occasional acrimony, there has all along been an attempt to maintain a working relationship or a *modus vivendi*.

The perspective of Indo-US relations has undergone major qualitative change over the past decade or so, mainly on account of the demise of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet bloc at the global level and the steady movement of India's economic policy towards liberalisation and globalisation. Nevertheless, the way in which Indo-US relations are likely to evolve in the backdrop of the altered scenario cannot be seen as independent of the factors and trends which determined them in the past (and particularly since 1971). Any relationship cannot develop autonomously of its past and this applies to the future of Indo-US relations as well. This research project has these concepts as its points of departure and the working hypothesis is that India

and the United States have consciously attempted to limit the negative consequences for their relationship of their divergent perceptions and stands on global, regional and bilateral issues even while asserting the differences in their policies and approaches in these respects.

The approach which has been followed in this research is to undertake a comprehensive and integrated study of political issues having a significance for Indo-US bilateral relations while adopting a critical historical method. The historical approach implies comparisons and analysis. In the collection of data, I have tried to be as objective as my resources permitted. As an Indian citizen I was amenable to making the mistake of defending India's foreign policy. Awareness of this fact, however, has been my greatest safeguard.

Since the project has sought to examine the development of Indo-US relations over a period of more than two decades, the first concern was to work out a narrative of the facts of the relationship as the referential framework for the exploration of the crucial issues and the process of their crystallisation and resolution. This narrative proved useful in identifying the crucial issues in the relationship and in the preliminary location of the same in the apparent overall structure of the relationship. The issues so identified have

been examined over the period of study by themselves, but without losing sight of their necessary linkages with the other issues. On account of the thirty-year rule access was not possible to the basic documents of the two governments (or their concerned deptts.) save for those which have been made public. On this account, therefore, I have relied upon the pronouncements (both on policy and programmes) of the high functionaries of the two countries and other authoritative bodies and individuals, the proceedings of their parliamentary institutions and their committees and sub-committees, the reports presented by state functionaries, bodies and agencies on the issues concerned or their collateral aspects, monographic and research literature and material taken from news-journals.

Study of relations of any country with the US remains an important area of research in view of the fact that there is hardly any country which can remain uninfluenced by machinations of the sole surviving superpower. I have therefore attempted to examine India's relations with the US according to my perception, but without any bias, by using the abundant literature on the subject which is readily available. Abundance of study material often creates a peculiar problem of the substandard printed matter circulating freely along

with authoritative texts and sources. The former often engages substantial time of the researcher who can identify the inadequacy of such sources leading to their rejection only after going through them. The process of sifting the grain from the chaff was therefore time consuming but things were facilitated under the able guidance of my supervisor Dr. (Prof) K.K. Misra who was always available with valuable suggestions to rescue me whenever I got stuck and felt helpless. Prof. Misra has always been a source of inspiration to me for his qualities of patience, imagination, and deep knowledge of international affairs and India's foreign policy. Though my work sometimes tended to proceed slowly, Prof. Misra never resented the same. The consistency in encouragement he extended to my efforts never dwindled. I am very grateful to him for undertaking the painstaking job of examining each and every word of my thesis and correcting and improving the contents of the same as also the language. I would be failing in my duty if I don't express my gratitude to all my family members who allowed me long hours of undisturbed work at my study table and never complained for the lack of time I had for them during the course of my research work.

This thesis is a modest attempt to examine some of the past as also issues of contemporary relevance in Indo-US

bilateral framework. Not only that, some of the current issues taken up in this thesis are pregnant with potential significance as relevant and alive issues. The views expressed in this thesis are my own and I fully accept the responsibility regarding the interpretations and analysis made and conclusions reached in this thesis.

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CHAPTER 1

THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER - A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

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THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER - A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When the American republic was young it received from India, in ideas. The Indian republic when young received from the United States in technology, and capital. Both have received and both have given, it is the Law of Nature¹. The history of Indo-US relations is thus one of mutual exchange in which both have benefitted, influenced each other, passed through periods of bonhomie and estrangement but neither one could come close to the other beyond a point nor could each insulate itself from the other. The history of Indo-US relations begins on the eve of America's entry into World War II. Before then, United States had scant contact with India, even though, in 1792, only three years after he became President, George Washington appointed Benjamin Joy as consul in Calcutta, then the capital of British India². America's desire in forging consular relations was necessitated out of business interests in such Indian commodities as cotton goods and spices. Beginning in 1784, American ships traded in India

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1. M.V.Kamath. The United States and India 1776-1976 (The Embassy of India, Washington D.C), p. 217.
 2. Gary Hess. America Encounters India, 1941-1947 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), p. 5.

and the Jay treaty gave the United States most favoured nation status in the East Indian trade. The trade became considerable during Napoleonic wars, when Indian trade with Europe was curtailed but after 1815 Indo-American trade declined¹. Shortly before world War II, Indian businessmen made an effort to promote the American market. In 1937 a handful of Indian businessmen in New York city organised the Indian Chamber of Commerce, and a year later the Govt. of India established a trade commission in New York². The first American flag-ship to enter an Indian port was 'Chesapeake' of Baltimore, which left United States in 1786 and returned with goods in 1789³.

Indian philosophy and religion have long attracted Americans to India, and by the end of the 19th century, Hinduism and Buddhism had left their mark on American culture. Raja Ram Mohan Roy, linked his Brahmo Samaj reform movement to the American Unitarians⁴. Emerson and Thoreau, taking inspiration from Indian metaphysics, launched the Transcendental Movement in America⁵. The Theosophical Society was founded in

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1. Gary Hess. America Encounters India, 1941-1947 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), p. 4.
 2. Ibid., p. 5.
 3. M.V.Kamath. The United States and India 1776-1976 (The Embassy of India, Washington D.C), p. 73.
 4. A Common Faith, 40 years of Indo-US Cooperation, 1947-1987 (Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi), p. 7.
 5. Ibid.

New York in 1875 by Colonel Henry Steel Olcott and Madame Helena Blavatsky, and one of its later members, J. Krishnamurti, broke away to form his own Krishnamurti Foundation in California¹. The World Parliament of Religion in 1893 attracted influential Indian intellectuals, including Swami Vivekananda, who established the New York Vedanta Society and inspired studies of India in many centres².

However, all was not well with the Indo-US association. The US interest in India in general and its national movement in particular developed gradually and hesitatingly. The initial US perception about India was distorted and the same was perceived as a land of mysteries. As Dennis Kux puts it "On the eve of World War II, India remained a country about which the United States had had little contact. American images of India flickered between exotic Hollywood portrayals of the British Raj and the adventure tales of Rudyard Kipling. Bejewelled maharajahs and British Colonial Sabibs, impoverished beggars and fakirs, massive demonstrations of Indian nationalists, and the complex problems of untouchability, caste and Hindu-Muslim communalism all made for a bewildering

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1. A Common Faith, 40 years of Indo-US Cooperation, 1947-1987 (Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi), p. 7.
 2. Ibid., p. 7.

melange"¹. The background of such a view was Katherine Mayo's book *Mother India*, published in 1927, which damaged the image of India by depiction of the same as depraved and squalid society². A best seller for two years, Mayo's criticism of Indian civilization influenced American attitudes toward India for at least a generation³. Apart from American bias about India's image, Indo-US relations were prevented from proceeding in a linear manner because of the damage they suffered on account of sporadic events which broke out from time to time. The 'barred zone' of the 1917 US immigration law which prohibited further labour immigration and the 1923 US Supreme Court ruling in the appeal of Bhagat Singh Thind that Hindus were ineligible for citizenship marred the relations of America and India⁴. Rabindra Nath Tagore curtailed his lecture tour in 1927 when he felt insulted by a US immigration official⁵.

The initial American attitude to Indian independence was not sympathetic. Though William Jennings Bryan during his visit to India in 1906 was convinced about the British

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1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies (1941-1991)*. (Sage Publication), p. 4.
 2. Harold Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Mind* (White Plains, NY: ME Sharpe, 1980), p. 269.
 3. Gary Hess. *America Encounters India 1941-1947* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), p. 3.
 4. Ibid., p. 7.
 5. Ibid., p. 14.

injustice in denying the Indians their aspirations for representative government, American officials in India showed little sympathy for the nationalists¹. Consular reports defended the British position and maintained that India was not ready for self-government. In January 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt affirmed unequivocally his belief in the civilizing and stabilizing benefits of British rule². However, there was moderation in the United States's Indian view with Franklin D. Roosevelt's ascent to power. He gained popularity in India for his New Deal domestic reforms and his anticolonialist attitude. The President's decision to grant independence to the Philippines in 1946 impressed Indians, Roosevelt's action sharply contrasted with British refusal to offer a timetable for Indian self-rule³. Meanwhile the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 offered a new lease of life to the national movement. This opportunity was seized, in different ways and with varying success, by the Ghadar revolutionaries based in North America and by Lokmanya Tilak, Anne Besant and their Home Rule Leagues in India⁴ Indian nationalism appeared

1. Gary Hess. *America Encounters India 1941-1947* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 8-9.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
3. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage), p. 5.
4. Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, K.N. Panikkar & Sucheta Mahajan. *India's Struggle for Independence* (Penguin Books), p. 146.

to traditional American conviction that people should rule themselves and reminded them about their own Revolution against British domination¹. The British were so-apprehensive about the Indians getting influenced by liberal American ideas that they disapproved their going to United States. Tarak Nath Das, an Indian student, and one of the first leaders of the Indian community in North America to start a paper (called Free Hindustan) realized that while the British government was keen on Indians going to Fiji to work as labourers for British planters, it did not want them to go to North America where they might be infected by ideas of liberty².

During the thirties and forties the United States began to take keen interest in political situation and gradually moved towards favouring Indian independence. The United States office of war information established branches in major cities and the Indian situation was discussed frequently in diplomatic conferences³. Gandhi's philosophy became central to the growing pacifist movement in the United States and India's

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1. Lawrence K. Rosinger. India and the United States- Political and Economic Relations (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1950), p. 9.
 2. Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, K.N. Panikkar and Sucheta Mahajan. India's Struggle for Independence (Penguin Books), p. 147.
 3. L. Natarajan. American Shadow over India (People's Publishing House), p. 31.

freedom movement seized the American imagination. Will Durant interrupted his "Story of Civilization" series to write The Case for India¹. Support for Indian independence grew, and in Jan 1931 a caravan of Indians and Americans travelled to Philadelphia to garland Liberty Bell and present to the mayor a copy of India's Declaration of Independence, which was based in large part on American document. Gandhi was chosen "Man of the year by Time Magazine"².

Even though America had learnt sufficiently about the colonial Indian situation and was convinced about India's case for freedom by the time of the second world war, it had avoided pressing the issue with Great Britain for the fear of risking war-effort. While the arrests made in the wake of the failure of August offer were regretted in the press and by the government, the prevalent attitude remained that India was not of immediate American concern. The New York Times deplored the imprisonment of patriots but said that American sympathy could go no further³. American consulate General Thomas Wilson reported extensively from Calcutta, but a bystander approach

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1. A Common Faith, 40 yrs of Indo-US Cooperation 1947-1987 (Prentice Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi), p. 8.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Gary Hess. America Encounters India 1941-47 (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 20-21.

prevailed in his dispatches¹. The first expression of American discontent with British policy toward India came in May 1941 proposal by Asstt. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Adolph A. Berle - a New Deal Liberal for pressure on London "to explore the possibility of making India equal of other members of the British Commonwealth". Berle argued that with India's vast pool of manpower, the country could achieve "a dominant position in supplying certain strategic war materials" if it became an "active rather than a passive partner in the war effort"². The Berle memorandum of May 5 stands out as the initial suggestion by a high-ranking official in the State Deptt. that the United States should pressure the British to solve the Indian problem³. American efforts to have a minister in New Delhi in exchange for agency general bore fruit when on July 21, 1941, the exchange was announced. The Viceroy designated a senior Indian Civil Servant, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, as Agent-General in

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1. New York Times, Nov. 10 and 15, 1940; Walter C. Mackett, "Some Aspects of the Development of American Opinion on India 1918-1947" (Ph.D. diss. University of Southern California, 1957), pp. 276-84; letter from Calcutta Aug. 10, 1940 845.00/1189 - cited in Gary Hess. America Encounters India, p. 21.
 2. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1941, Vol. III, pp. 176-77.
 3. Gary Hess. America Encounters India 1941-47 (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press, 1971), p. 23.

Washington, the State Deptt. named career diplomat Thomas Wilson, the Consul General in Calcutta, to become US Commissioner in New Delhi. In keeping with their unusual semi-diplomatic status, Bajpai and Wilson presented Roosevelt and Viceroy Linlithgow personal letters of introduction rather than the usual diplomatic letters of credence¹.

The most positive American contribution to Indian independence was in their insistence on broad interpretation and universal application of the concept of self determination, including the right of colonies to become independent. This stand was opposed to the narrower British view which held that self-determination applied only to Nazi occupied territories and not to the British empire. Addressing the Parliameent on Sept 9, 1941, Churchill, without mincing words, made the provocative statement regarding the inapplicability of Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter to the British empire. The article was designed for people under Nazi subjugation, countries under British rule were another matter². Churchill's statement disappointed both America and India but nothing meaningful could be done because of Under

1. FRUS, 1941, Vol. III, pp. 170-74.

2. Gary Hess. America Encounters India, 1941-47 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1971), p. 28.

Secretary Sumner Welles's disapproval of State Dept's Near Eastern Division suggestion that President pursue the matter with Churchill for extension of Atlantic Charter to India. Welles argued vehemently against US pressing Churchill, during difficult times, to do something to which he was opposed¹. Before the finalisation of the Atlantic Charter, President Roosevelt raised the issue of India at a personal level with Churchill at the Atlantic summit itself. During an after dinner talk on the second evening of the conference, Roosevelt criticised British colonialism². But Churchill was antagonised over the issue and disagreement persisted between the two leaders in his matter³. Again when Churchill visited Washington during Christmas 1941, Roosevelt raised the issue. Churchill later wrote "I reacted so strongly and at such length that he never raised it (India) verbally again"⁴. Harry Hopkins, the adviser of Roosevelt said that no American suggestions during the war were "so wrathfully received as those relating to the solution of the Indian problem"⁵.

1. FRUS, 1941, Vol. III, pp. 184-87.

2. Elliott Roosevelt, 'As He Saw It' (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), pp. 35-37.

3. Ibid.

4. Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 208-209.

5. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage), p. 10.

However, all US efforts did not go in vain. Constant US prodding obliged Britain to withdraw their objection to India signing the united Nations declaration. On New Years's Day 1942, Girija Shankar Bajpai was among the twenty-six signatories of the United Nations declaration¹.

The American interest in Indian affairs was evident when Roosevelt sent his personal emissary, Louis Johnson to India during the Cripps Mission to act as an intermediary². Many Indians appreciated the gesture of participation of Louis Johnson in the Cripps Mission. Even the Indian National Congress favoured Johnson's role as a helpful one, despite the negative results of negotiations³. In 1940, Nehru referred to the United States as the "great democratic country which seems alone to keep the torch of democratic freedom alight in a world given over to violence and aggression and opportunism of the worst kind"⁴. While he was a member of Lord Wavell's Interim government Nehru expressed his eagerness to establish

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1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage), p. 11.
 2. R.V.R. Chandra Shekhar Rao "Searching for a Mature Relationship, the United States and India". *The Round Table*: July 1976, p. 249.
 3. Lawrence K. Rosinger. *India & the United States Political & Eco. Relations* (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1950), p. 9.
 4. Cited in B.N. Chakravarty. *India Speaks to America* (The John Day Company; New York), p. 16.

diplomatic relations with the United States.¹

Before the announcement of the United States decision on the Cripps Mission, President Roosevelt had sent a long cable to Churchill on March 10, 1942 on the Indian problem. "Of course this is a subject", he observed: "which all of you, good people, know far more about than I do and I have felt much diffidence, in making any suggestions concerning it". His main contention, however, was to transfer power to the Indians and at least to provide "a new thought on the question"². The efforts of Roosevelt annoyed Churchill, who described American participation as "unwarranted and effort to advance American interests at the expense of the British"³.

President Roosevelt's envoy William Phillips proposed a round table conference of Britain and India under American chairmanship in March 1943, and on March 14, Phillips suggested to President Roosevelt: "I feel strongly, Mr President, that in view of our military position in India, we should have a voice in these matters. It is not right for the

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1. Philips Talbot and S.L. Poplai. India and America. A Study of Their Relations (Council on foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, New York, 1958), p. 16.
 2. Naresh Chandra Roy. India and United States of America (A Study of International Relations, A Mukherjee & Co. Ltd., Calcutta, 1954, p. 16.
 3. L. Natarajan. American Shadow over India (People's Publishing House), p. 31.

British to say that is none of our business when we alone presumably will have the major part to play in the struggle with Japan"¹. American efforts however failed to convince the British Prime Minister Churchill Louis Johnson and William Phillips both reached the same conclusion that the British were not willing to wind up their empire in India. Both thought the United States should actively press for India's independence but failed to propel President Roosevelt into a battle that he was likely to lose with Britain².

During World War II, the United States and India were drawn closer and their problems - economic and political were discussed and settled through the British embassy in Washington and American embassy in London³. Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit's visit to the United States in 1945 paved the way for proper understanding of each other's problems and America once again raised its voice for freedom of India⁴. Even before the end of the war Indo-American political

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1. Lawrence K. Rosinger. India & the United States - Political & Eco-Relations. (The Macmillan Co. New York 1950), p. 21.
 2. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage), p. 35.
 3. Lawrence K. Rosinger, op. cit., p. 23.
 4. L. Natarajan. American Shadow Over India (People's Publishing House), p. 35.

relations began to strengthen through diplomatic channels. The United States played an active role in the release of the Indian leaders and in the organisation of the Simla Conference of June-July 1945. Despite the failure of the conference, the role of the American government was highly acclaimed by the Indian National Congress¹.

Despite the positive American contribution to India's liberation struggle, it did not fully meet Indian expectations. If the US attitude toward Indian nationalism was ambivalent - support for independence yet disappointment over the attitude of the nationalists towards the war effort - the Indian reaction to US policy was similarly ambiguous². The Indians appreciated the indications of US support for the nationalist cause. Johnson's and Phillips views were known during the war. Roosevelt's sharp exchanges with Churchill were revealed in later years. At the same time, Indians felt let down by the United States, especially after Roosevelt refused to intervene in August 1942 over the Quit India Movement and thereafter remained unwilling to press the

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1. Lawrence K. Rosinger. India and the United States- Political and Economic Relations (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1950), p. 24.
 2. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage), p. 38.

British to make further political concessions¹. The first extended interaction between the United States and India foreshadowed the frustrations that would follow during the next five decades².

A new era of Indo-US friendly relations full of future hopes and expectations commenced with India's Independence on August 15, 1947. President Harry S. Truman's greetings to the Indians on this occasion noted: "We welcome India's new and enhanced status in the world community of sovereign independent, nations, assure the new Dominion of our continued friendship and good-will and reaffirm our confidence that India, dedicated to the cause of peace and to the advancement of all people, will take its place at the forefront of the nations of the world in the struggle to fashion a world society founded in mutual trust and respect. India faces many grave problems, but its resources are vast, and I am confident that its people and leadership are equal to the tasks ahead. In the years to come the people of this great new nation will find the United States a constant friend. I earnestly hope that our friendship will in the future, as in the past, continue to be expressed in close and fruitful cooperation in

1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage), p. 38.

2. *Ibid.*

international undertakings and in cordiality in our relations one with the other"¹. India's policy towards the United States was indicated in the very first policy statement of Nehru on Sept 7, 1946. Nehru acknowledged the dominant role that the USA was destined to play in world affairs. On that occasion he said, "we send our greetings to the people of the United States of America to whom destiny has given a major role in international affairs. We trust that this tremendous responsibility will be utilized for the furtherance of peace and human freedom everywhere"².

Although India and America had started off well, as India was fascinated by the American Declaration of Independence and aspired for the American ideals of progress and democracy, soon their relations became subject to stresses and strains due to difference of views regarding non-alignment, nature of communist threat and maintenance of peace and security. India refused to become an American camp follower. American leadership was so much obsessed with international communism

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1. Raymond Dennett and Robbert K. Turner (edited). Documents on American Foreign Relations (published for World Peace Foundation, Princeton University Press, Princeton), Vol. IX, Jan 1-Dec 1, 1947, p. 581.
 2. Jawaharlal Nehru. India's Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches, Sept. 1946 - April 1961 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1961), p. 3.

that they regarded India's refusal to collaborate with western collective security efforts against the Soviet Union as a form of open hostility undermining American national interest and foreign policy objectives¹. In this context, US secretary of state John Foster Dulles characterised India's policy of non-alignment as "immoral". He once declared: "Those who are not with us are against us".². India's attempt to act independently and acquire a regional role for itself with a view to inspiring the like-minded non-aligned countries to work-together thereby ensuring that Asia remained free of great power influence militated against the US policy of forging global linkages and alliances to act as a bulwark against expansion of communism. Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh are of the view that the objectives of the Indian foreign policy during the early years of independence were to eliminate the western presence from Asia and to establish a group of states which could powerfully sponsor Asian objectives in the global arena³.

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1. A Appadorai and M.S. Rajan. India's Foreign Policy and Relations (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985), p. 243.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh. A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Bombay, 1971), p. 352.

The Indonesian crisis of 1949 brought India and the United States in the forefront for the first time in the history of independent India to test the reciprocity in the international affairs between the two countries. The stand of both India and USA vis-a-vis the Indonesian crisis coincided, both took a strong note of the so called Dutch police action of Dec. 1948. The United States and Australia called for an immediate meeting of the Security Council where the delegates of India, Australia and USSR called Dutch action a 'deliberate act of aggression'¹. Initially USA was skeptical about India convening Eighteen Nations Conference but Nehru's assurance that the conference was not going to compete with the international organisation set at rest all American doubts. Nehru made the intention of the conference clear "we meet therefore within the framework of the United Nations and the noble words of the charter before us. The charter itself recognises regional arrangements as a means of furthering international peace and security..... We meet to supplement the efforts of the security council not to supplant that body. We meet in no spirit of hostility to any nation or group of

1. John C. Campbell. The United States in World Affairs 1948-49 (Council on Foreign Relations, Harper and Brother, New York, 1949), pp. 317-18.

nations, but in an endeavour to promote peace through the extension of freedom"¹. The United States was expecting somewhat this type of statement which prompted American Ambassador Henderson to declare that America would approve such a conference. The New Delhi conference's policy on Indonesia was much closer to the United States' approach to the crisis. In the Round Table conference of Dutch Republic on Aug. 23, 1949 at Hague, the United States did not officially participate. But through the diplomatic skill of H. Merle Cochren, US member of the UN Commission on Indonesia, the Conference drew to a successful conclusion acknowledging Indonesia sovereignty by Netherlands in Nov. 1949². Thus the cooperative efforts of India and the United States were successful in achieving their objective of Indonesian freedom.

During his first three-week trip to the United States in Oct.-Nov. 1949, Nehru was accorded a warm welcome. On Oct. 13, 1949, he addressed a joint session of the House of Rep. and Senate. Acknowledging that the American Declaration of Independence had greatly influenced the drafting of India's

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1. Jawaharlal Nehru. India's Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches, Sept. 1946-Apr. 1961 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1961), p. 409.
 2. Richard P. Stebbins. The United States in World Affairs 1949 (Council on foreign Relations, Harper & Brother, New York, 1950), p. 444.

Constitution he said "we have placed in the forefront of our Constitution those fundamental human rights to which all men who love liberty, equality and progress aspire - the freedom of the individual, the equality of men and the rule of law. We enter, therefore, the community of free nations with the roots of democracy deeply embedded in our institutions as well as in the thoughts of our people"¹. Later addressing the East and West Association, the Foreign Policy Association, the India League of America, and the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York on Oct. 19, 1949, Nehru reiterated India's desire to have American friendship. He declared: "The question of India and the United States understanding each other and developing closer relations is not only important from the point of view of these two countries but has a larger importance and significance"². However such public posturing failed to hide the mutual suspicions and skepticism whose undercurrents were obvious even as early as the period immediately following India's independence. The Americans could not appreciate Nehru's views on foreign policy. After a three hour meeting with Nehru, Secretary of State Dean Acheson was to later write

1. Jawaharlal Nehru. India's Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches, Sept. 1946-Apr. 1961 (New Delhi Publications Division, 1961), p. 591.

2. Ibid.

that Nehru was one of the most difficult men he had ever dealt with and the impossibility of having pleasant friendship with him¹. Nehru's ambivalence towards the US resulted from his perception of the existence of a big gap between Indian and US world views which made convergence of their thinking difficult. The American perception of threat to world peace and the methods pursued by it to ensure global security was regarded by Nehru as a source of potential danger in itself to global peace. Thus any suggestion by India to America to be more reasonable in its dealings with the Russians and extension of recognition to communist China was seriously misinterpreted by the US. During his 1949 visit to US Nehru made a case for the recognition of communist China. He pointed out that US desire to isolate China would lead to strengthened Sino-Soviet ties². Although India had plenty of company in its China policy-including the closest US allies, Britain and Canada, Washington's differences with New Delhi over China added to bilateral frictions, particularly after the Chinese intervened militarily in Korea³. India on its part could not

1. Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation (New York. Norton & Co. 1969), p. 336.

2. FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, pp. 1750-56.

3. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage, New Delhi), p. 77.

tolerate US hobnobbing with Delhi's bete-noire-Pakistan. Nehru was terribly annoyed to learn that few months after his return from 1949 visit to US, Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was accorded a warm welcome in USA. He wrote to his sister in Washington "The Americans are either very naive or singularly lacking in intelligence. They go through the same routine whether it is Nehru or the Shah or Liaquat Ali It does appear that there is a concerted attempt to build up Pakistan and build down, if I may say, India. It surprises me how immature in their political thinking the Americans are In their dealings with Asia, they show a lack of understanding which is surprising"¹.

Kashmir was one issue which soured the relations between US and independent India from the very beginning. India was greatly dissatisfied with the partisan attitude of the US over Kashmir. US stand was regarded by Indians as pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian. It was difficult for the Indians to understand how on the one hand the United States conceded that Kashmir's sovereignty had been transferred to India and on the other refused to support India's case that the tribal invasion aided

1. Letters from Nehru to Mrs. Pandit, May 10th and 29th, 1950, quoted in Gopal, Vol. II, p. 63.

and abetted by Pakistan constituted an act of aggression¹. While the United States overlooked the well established facts of Pakistani aggression on Kashmir, it laid great emphasis on the need to settle the issue by means of a plebiscite². Nehru was compelled to say that the United States had taken a "strongly narrow view" in that matter³. In 1954 Nehru said "United States has not only not condemned it (aggression) but we have been asked not to press it in the interest of peace"⁴. Norman D. Palmer has observed "on the whole, however, the official and unofficial American views on kashmir have been more sympathetic with Pakistan than with the Indian case, an attitude reflected in votes by American representatives whenever the kashmir question has been brought before the Security Council"⁵.

The Korean issue also found India and America pitted on opposite sides. If India was dissatisfied by American attitude over Kashmir, US too was disillusioned by Indian stand vis-a-

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1. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan. India's Foreign Policy and Relations (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985), p. 220.
 2. Ibid.
 3. New York Times, March 6, 1948.
 4. Quoted in T.V. Kunhi Krishnan. The Unfriendly Friends: India and America (New Delhi, 1974), p. 129.
 5. N.D. Palmer. South Asia and United States Policy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 26.

vis the Korean crisis. India's abstention from the July 7th Security Council resolution after having supported the June 25th and 27th resolutions annoyed the United States. The abstention of India appeared to the United States as withdrawal from its military commitment and being hypocritical¹. Nehru's insistence that China be given representation in the United Nations with a view to breaking the deadlock, enabling China, Soviet Union and US to cooperate with each other was not endorsed in the United States. India was accused of mixing the Korean issue with the representation of China in the Security Council². Acheson in a reply to Nehru's letter stated "In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant governments for China's seat in the UN is one which must be reached by the UN on its merit. It is a question on which there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the UN the decision should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which would subject the UN to coercion and duress"³. India's action of mixing the Korean and Chinese membership

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1. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan. India's Foreign Policy and Relations (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985), p. 226.
 2. Ibid., pp. 226-227.
 3. Deptt. of State Bulletin (Washington DC), Vol. 23, July 31, 1950, p. 171.

issues had a parallel in the recent past in 1948 in the form of US support to Pakistan's Zafrullah Khan's move to club the matters like 'forcible and unlawful occupation of Junagadh, Manavadar and some other states in Kathiawar by India' with the Kashmir issue¹. India objected that the issues of Junagadh and Manavadar be not mixed up with the Kashmir issue. Gopalaswami Ayyangar strongly protested maintaining that the matters raised by Pakistan could be taken up separately and the Council could not change the item on the agenda from 'Jammu and Kashmir Question' to 'India-Pak' question². Warren Austin, the US delegate supported the Pakistani stand in widening the scope of the dispute from that on Kashmir to include all other Indo-Pakistani problems³.

The problem with Indo-US dialogue at any stage in history is the failure to appreciate each other's stand point. Whenever one has adopted an approach of moderation with a view to limiting the consequences of the crisis, the other has misinterpreted it and taken it as a support to party which in

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1. Speech of Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan in SCOR, 3 Yr. 228-29 mtgs, Jan. 16-17, 1948.
 2. SCOR, 3 yr mtg 232, Jan. 23, 1948, p. 176.
 3. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan. India's Foreign Policy and Relations (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985), p. 226.

its view was the aggressor. Dennis Kux says, "In Kashmir, where Indian soldiers shed their blood against Pakistan, the US attitude badly upset the government of India. In Korea, where the US soldiers were shedding their blood against North Korean and Chinese communist forces, the Indian attitude badly upset the US govt. India and the United States each wanted aggression punished and basic principles of international morality upheld. Fearful of expanded conflict in the Far East, the Indians urged moderation and compromise in the case of Korea. Fearful of an India-Pakistan war, the United States similarly urged moderation and compromise in the case of Kashmir. Neither Washington nor New Delhi won friends in each other's capital by playing the peacemaker"¹.

Indo-US relations were further strained because of India's refusal to sign the Peace Treaty with Japan. Nehru believed that the treaty should have included the Soviet Union and Communist China was also unhappy about the security arrangements between Japan and the United States. India's decision caused resentment and disappointment in the United States.²

1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage), pp. 77-78.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

The lowest point in Indo-American relations, except in 1971, came in 1954, with the US military associations with Pakistan, both bilaterally, through a mutual security arrangement and the extension of military aid, and multilaterally through Pakistan's participation in the American sponsored alliance system, first in the Manila Pact (SEATO) and in 1955 in the Baghdad pact (later CENTO)¹. Indians reacted vehemently against President Eisenhower's announcement in Feb. 1954. They were further offended by Eisenhower's offer of a similar arrangement with India and by his assurances that the military relationship with and assistance to Pakistan were in no-way directed against India². President Eisenhower in his letter to PM Nehru assured him that he would take strong action if Pakistan used such aid against India: "... I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately appropriate action both with and without the UN to thwart such aggression"³.

During the two major world crises of 1956, India and

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1. Norman D. Palmer. The United States and India: Dimensions of Influence (praeger), p. 24.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Deptt. of State Bulletin, Vol. 30, March 15, 1954, p.401.

United States were both opposed to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, but they were far apart in their reactions to the Hungarian crisis, with the United States immediately and strongly denouncing the Soviet invasion and brutalities in Hungary and with India delaying for several weeks before Nehru came out with relatively mild expressions of disapproval of the Soviet action¹. This attitude made India susceptible to the charge of pursuance of double standard. It also created an impression that India was moving closer to the Soviet Union in the international affairs².

Nehru's second official visit to the United States in Dec. 1956 went off well. Nehru was in a better mood than in 1949 and he and President Eisenhower apparently established a good working relationship³. Eisenhower also, visited India in Dec. 1959 to a tumultuous welcome. Addressing the Indian Parliament on Dec. 10, 1959 President Eisenhower made a fervent plea for world peace. He declared that history portrays 'a world too, often, tragically divided by misgivings and mistrust'. Time and again governments had abused the field

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1. Norman D. Palmer. The United States and India: Dimensions of Influence (Praeger), p. 25.
 2. P.M.Kamath eds. Indo-US Relations: Dynamics of Change (SAP, New Delhi), p. 8.
 3. Norman D. Palmer, op. cit., p. 25.

of the earth 'by staining them with blood and scarring them with the weapons of war'. He asked 'Must we continue to live with prejudices, practices and policies that will condemn our children and our children's children to live helplessly in the pattern of the past awaiting possibly a time of war-borne obliteration? We all fervently pray not. Indeed there can be no statesmanship in any person of responsibility who does not concur in this world-wide prayer',¹. Eisenhower's visit helped to improve the tone of Indo-American relations but not beyond a point. T.N.Kaul later wrote 'His visit created a very good impression and aroused great enthusiasm but it was based more on sentimental and emotional emphasis than on mutuality of interests and outlook',². Eisenhower's visit was followed by Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson in May 1961 and by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey in Feb. 1966. President Richard Nixon visited India in July 1969³. In March 1962, Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy was received with great warmth in Delhi, 'Jackie Kennedy's trip in India', reported Life, 'became a story-book journey'. Life said: 'As day followed vivid day,

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1. M.V.Kamath. The United States and India 1776-1976 (The Embassy of India, Washington DC), pp. 100-101.
 2. T.N. Kaul. The Kissinger Years: Indo-American Relations (Arnold-Heinemann, 1980), p. 71.
 3. M.V.Kamath, op. cit., p. 100.

India's magic began to work on Mrs. Kennedy'. Whenever she went, there were presents. Mrs. Kennedy remarked: 'Its been a dream'. And Life added: 'while India left its mark on Jackie, her beauty and her undiluted joy at what she saw left their mark on India. Long after her visit people still called her Ameriki Rani, Queen of America'¹.

One notable feature of Indo-US relations all along was the existence of certain level of economic relations and the transfer of aid from US to India despite differences on the political front from time to time and intensification of the cold war in South Asia. US had a compulsion to keep India economically strong for the survival of democracy otherwise the apprehension was that India might switch over to communism. Therefore, guided by its strategy of containment of communism which had earlier obliged US to extend economic aid to western European countries under the Marshall plan, in South Asia too, the US found it to some extent necessary to ensure through aid and loans that India remained sufficiently strong to resist the allurements of communism. Not only did the Eisenhower administration spend a large part of the American GNP on foreign aid programme but India received maximum

1. M.V.Kamath. The United States and India 1776-1976 (The Embassy of India, Washington DC), p. 100.

foreign aid from the US during this period¹. The Truman goal of demonstrating through India that development through democracy was not only desirable but also feasible was still a valid goal in the Eisenhower Administration². Chester Bowles had always advocated transfer of economic aid to India, he linked the fate of India's economic development to US security interests in Asia. The choice, Bowles declared, was between the current democratic government or, if India failed to develop, communism³.

Nehru made the third official visit to the United States in Nov. 1961. President Kennedy while welcoming Nehru said: "India and America are separated by half the globe, but I think that you are aware, as you surely must have been aware during the long days of your struggle for independence, of the great well of affections and regard for which your country and people are held in this country - a great affection and regard which belongs to you particularly in these difficult days"⁴. However, despite the rhetorical speech, the visit was a disappointment to both the leaders. Arthur Schlesinger

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1. P.M.Kamath eds. Indo-US Relations: Dynamics of change (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi), p. 9.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage), p. 82.
 4. Deptt. of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1171, Dec. 4, 1961, p. 926.

observes "Nehru, alas, was no longer the man he had once been"¹. Tensions between India and the United States mounted in Dec. 1961 when Indian troops entered Goa and liberated it from the Portuguese rule. Kennedy was particularly annoyed that Nehru had not given even a hint to him of the impending action in Goa and he instructed Ambassador J.K. Galbraith to do every thing he could to arrest the contemplated military action². Galbraith was able to persuade Nehru to postpone the action, but not to abandon it. American spokesmen were sharply critical of the Indian move into Goa and the American press took an even more strident view³.

The Chinese aggression in 1962 provided an opportunity for the improvement of Indo-US relations. India's request for military hardware was given sympathetic consideration by the Kennedy Administration. The first consignment of US arms arrived on Nov. 3rd while the pact between the two countries was signed on Nov. 14, 1962⁴. The other favour which US did to India was to agree to accept payment for arms in rupees in

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1. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. A Thousand Days : John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 456.
 2. Norman D. palmer. The United States and India. The Dimensions of Influence (Praeger), p. 27.
 3. Ibid.
 4. D.R. Mankekar. The Guilty Men of 1962 (Bombay, 1968), p. 64.

order to avoid a drain on India's foreign exchange resources¹. Besides, the US military aid came without any political strings attached to it. While thanking the western nations for military aid, PM Nehru said that the aid had not meant the abandonment of India's policy of non-alignment. "As a matter of fact", he said "the head of one western country now giving us arms has written to me saying he had not wanted India to change its traditional policy of non-alignment". Although the Prime Minister did not name the person, there was wide speculation that he meant President Kennedy². Every member of parliament admired the warm concern and timely assistance rendered by the United States. While speaking in the Parliament after proclamation of the emergency on account of Chinese aggression, A.P. Jain (Cong.) said "Englishmen have realized the realities and they do not want to impose any condition. The same is the attitude of both the States Deptt. and the majority of the people in the United States. They know the righteousness of the Indian cause. They want to help India. They feel that India's cause is not only that India but of all the democracies"³. Profound gratitude was expressed by

1. New York Times, Nov. 8, 1962.

2. New York Times, Nov. 12, 1962.

3. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. IX, No.1, Nov. 8 to 20, 1962, Col.412.

Dr. B.N. Singh and Bhagwat Jha Azad in the Parliament to the United States for its military and economic help given during the Chinese aggression¹.

However, the pro-American feelings soon began to disappear as India recovered from the shock of the Chinese attack and a sharp reaction set in because of the joint pressure of the United States and Britain on India and Pakistan to hold a series of meetings to seek a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Indians were disappointed at this attitude, they felt they were being made to pay the price for the help given during the Chinese war. Chester Bowles also disapproved the idea to influence India in this matter. He wrote "we had also - rather ineptly, I thought - seized upon India's acute need for US assistance as a lever to force India to make concessions to the Pakistanis in regard to Kashmir, which no democratic Indian government could make and survive"². The futility of the American attempts were in evidence when the Indo-Pak talks were suspended indefinitely in the spring of 1963 on account of the uncompromising mood of

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. IX, No.1, Nov. 8 to 20, 1962, Col.487.
 2. Chester Bowles. Promises to Keep, My Years in Public Life, 1941-69 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 439.

both the countries¹. Nehru's interest in obtaining large-scale military assistance from US supported by Bowles and Galbraith, and US Congress opposition to this proposal resulted in the initiation of a limited military assistance worth \$100 million on an intermittent basis which was however suspended two years later when Indo-Pak war broke out in 1965².

The Vietnam war also influenced the Indo-American relations significantly. Nehru had been critical of the US policies in Vietnam. Increased American involvement in the Vietnam war and its Americanization made India as a non-aligned nation criticize the war and openly demand American withdrawal³. The escalation of the Vietnam war by the Johnson Administration and Mrs. Gandhi's radical leftist posture in domestic affairs and moving closer to the Soviet Union more or less all occurred at the same time⁴. While the Johnson Administration counted India on their side on the Vietnam at least during the Feb.1965 bombing, India's public criticism of the US handling of the war only irritated the policy makers⁵.

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1. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India. Dimensions of Influence (Praeger), p. 28.
 2. Ibid.
 3. P.M.Kamath eds. Indo-US Relations: Dynamics of Change (SAP, New Delhi), p. 10.
 4. Ibid., p. 15.
 5. Ibid., p. 15.

The Indo-Pak war of Aug-Sept 1965 aroused anti-American feelings in India. India protested to the United States for the alleged use by Pakistan of American arms against India. It reminded the Johnson administration that President Eisenhower when he announced his decision to extend arms aid to Pakistan had assured Nehru that the arms would not be used against India, but if they were, the United States would take steps to prevent their misuse¹. The Indian government was annoyed that the US govt., without taking into account which country was wrong, equated the aggressor and the aggrieved party. It addressed identical ceasefire appeals to both India and Pakistan and suspended economic and military aid to both the countries². US policy during the 1965 war pleased neither India nor Pakistan. The Indians were angry that the United States failed to prevent the use of American arms despite repeated promises that it would do so. Washington's even handed action in stopping military and economic assistance to both countries also irked New Delhi, for there seemed little doubt that Pakistan started the trouble by launching Operation

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1. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India: Dimensions of Influence (Praeger), p. 30.
 2. A.Appadorai and M.S. Rajan. India's Foreign Policy and Relations (SAP, New Delhi), p. 242.

Gibraltar¹. The Pakistanis were even more bitter. That Washington - their supposed ally-not only refused to help against India but even cut off the flow of military supplies seemed an act of betrayal. US Pakistan relations plummeted².

The US food aid to India finalised during Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the United States in March 1966 had strings attached to it. India was required to undertake economic reforms as per the recommendations of the World Bank. The meeting of Indira Gandhi and Lyndon Johnson was the most successful one. Talking to Indian Planning Minister Mehta on May 4th Johnson said "The visit of PM Gandhi was as perfect as any visit could be there was now a complete atmosphere of trust and confidence between India and United States".³

In keeping with the agreement she had reached with Johnson, Mrs. Gandhi, ignoring the advice of the senior party leaders of the adverse impact tampering with the parity rate of rupee would have on the electoral prospects in view of the general elections six months after, went ahead with the announcement of devaluation in June 1966⁴. The criticism at

1. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage), p. 239.

2. Ibid.

3. Memorandum of the President's meeting with Indian Planning Minister Mehta, May 4, 1966.

4. Dennis Kux, op. cit., p. 253.

home especially by the left of the devaluation process¹ and the Soviet displeasure at India having moved closer to the USA and pursuance of market oriented policies obliged Mrs. Gandhi to mend fences with Soviet Union during a visit to Moscow in July 1966². Mrs. Gandhi, during this visit echoed the Soviet line on Vietnam. This meant a departure from the earlier response to this issue during Shastri who was relatively cooperative to the US in this matter³. Indian attitude annoyed the US. When Bowles tried to defend India by comparing its response with the Pope or UN Secretary General the reply from Washington was "The Pope and U Thant don't need our wheat"⁴.

The US dissatisfaction with the Indian policy vis-a-vis Vietnam resulted in the application of the short tether policy to US grain shipments to India, even though India was suffering from drought and want of food⁵. The aim of this policy ostensibly was to "keep recipients on a short leash in order to force their attention towards domestic agriculture" and "to force other countries to share the burden of food-aid

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1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage), p. 253.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
 4. Chester Bowles. *Promises to Keep, My years in Public Life 1941-1969* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 526.
 5. N.D.Palmer. *The United States and India. Dimensions of Influence* (Praeger), p. 32.

for India"¹. But the attempt which understandably was to influence India to change its policy proved counter-productive and only served to generate anti-American sentiments in India². Chester Bowles, then the US Ambassador to India disapproved of this policy. He wrote that "on at least five occasions in the critical years of 1965, 1966 and 1967 the President put the Indian govt. and people through a needless ordeal in regard to food supplies with no valid explanation even to me and my associates"³.

In 1967 India "began to sign economic cooperation pacts and trade protocols with Soviet bloc nations and Indo-American relations grew increasingly distant"⁴. India's criticism of the Arab-Israel war, official greeting by India to Ho-Chi Minh on his 77th birthday, Mrs. Gandhi's participation in Moscow in 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution further antagonized USA⁵. This led to the continuation of the short-tether policy

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1. James Warner Bjorkman "Public Law 480 and the Policies of Self Help and Short-Tether: Indo-American Relations, 1965-68", in Lloyd I. Rudolph, Susanne Haerber Rudolph and others 'The Regional Imperative' (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), pp. 231, 232.
 2. N.D.Palmer. The United States & India: Dimensions of Influence (Praeger), p. 32.
 3. Chester Bowles. Promises to Keep, My Years in Public Life 1941-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 534.
 4. James Warner Bjorkman, op. cit., p. 233.
 5. N.D.Palmer. The United States & India: Dimensions of Influence (Praeger), p. 32.

but ironically the late 1960s - which was not a bright phase of Indo-US relations - witnessed US aid to India reach all-time heights even though it was made available intermittently¹.

The events occurring in the decades following India's independence suggest that Indo-US relations are based on a deep degree of distrust. Both the democracies have too many similarities for outright hostility but are also quite different to evolve sufficient meeting points. During the extended regime of Nehru and brief tenure of Shastri, India's foreign policy was influenced by a fair degree of idealism whereas US was guided by the exigencies of realpolitik in its containment of communism policy. Probably the world views of both the countries were different. They had to be as India's colonial memory was still fresh, US had buried colonial past deep in history. Their security and strategic perceptions were different. US perceived immediate threat to the world peace from communism and therefore wanted rest of the countries to join its bloc to counter the Soviet-bloc. India on the other hand, viewed, pursuance of the policy which led to the further polarisation of the world, a threat to global peace. There was

1. N.D.Palmer. The United States & India: Dimensions of Influence (Praeger), p. 32.

sufficient interaction both at people to people and government to government level but the time gap of historical processes, differing degrees of political and economic development and disparate views about national interest caused the development of mutually inconsistent perceptions of global security which precluded a reciprocal understanding of attitudes and motivations.

CHAPTER II

SOUTH ASIAN CRISIS 1971 & INDO-US RELATIONS

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SOUTH ASIAN CRISIS 1971 & INDO-US RELATIONS

The Bangladesh crisis appeared to be an internal affair of Pakistan but a close analysis of the same established beyond doubt that it had wider ramifications, so much so that the spill over effect engulfed India by confronting it with massive refugee problem. India was dragged in this crisis because the lakhs of Bangladeshi refugees who had taken shelter in the Indian territory were causing unprecedented drain on India's economy. The active US interest in the South Asian crisis, its firm and overt support to Pakistan and Nixon-Kissinger's action of exoneration of Pakistan military junta's atrocities - because of Nixon's dependence on Yahya Khan for securing an opening with China - was sought to be justified by giving this regional problem a global colour and holding both India and Soviet Union guilty in this process.

The growing Sino-Soviet rift and the nuclear parity Soviet Union achieved with the United States, motivated the Nixon administration to normalize its relations with People's China¹. Pakistan helped the United States in this course.

1. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985), p. 243.

President Yahya Khan of Pakistan went to Peking with a personal message from President Nixon for Mao Tse-tung. Later on in July 1971, the Pakistani government arranged a secret visit by Henry Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Adviser, to Peking¹. Pakistani help to the US therefore in securing a breakthrough in reversing the deadlocked Sino-US relations made Washington pro-Islamabad. Thus when the Indo-Pakistan war broke out in Dec. 1971, the American government under President Nixon, in disregard of American public opinion, and of Congressmen, Senators and other sections of the American public, not only openly backed the west Pakistan military junta but also held India responsible for the Bangladesh crisis.² Yahya Khan's courier role was unquestionably a major consideration in shaping the policy of Nixon and Kissinger during the 1971 South Asia crisis. It helped to account for their pro-Pakistan and anti-India "tilt" under circumstances that would seem to dictate a very different kind of policy³. The Sino-American rapprochement also, became a cause of Indo-US estrangement in 1971. N.D. Palmer writes "The impending

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1. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985), p. 243.
 2. Ibid.
 3. N.D. Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 46.

thaw in Sino-American relations added to the alarm in India over the pro-Pakistan position of both the United States and China in the South Asian crisis, raising fresh apprehensions of a possible Sino-American-Pakistan axis against India. Kissinger had already warned the Indian govt. that if war broke out in the subcontinent, China might intervene; and he had stated that if China attacked India this time, India should not expect the United States to provide military and other support as it had done in 1962"¹.

After the Pakistani armed forces were ordered to suppress the opposition in East Pakistan and resorted to brutal measures to do so, the question of continuing American military assistance to Pakistan became a major source of friction with India, as well as with domestic critics of the administration's South Asia policies². When the repression in East Pakistan began, the United States imposed an embargo on further arms sales and shipments to Pakistan except, as soon became clear, for certain items already "in the pipeline"³. Moreover the continuance of the supplies to Pakistan for several months after March 25, despite US assurances to the

1. N.D. Palmer, *The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence* (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 47.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 44

contrary, was a continuing embarrassment to many Americans and a major irritant in Indo-American relations, which were becoming increasingly strained as the tragedy in South Asia unfolded¹. Swaran Singh charged that the US arms to Pakistan, "not only amount to a condoning of these atrocities, but could be construed as an encouragement to their continuation"².

The US role during the South Asian crisis came in for heavy criticism in the Indian Parliament. Joyotirmoy Basu (CPI-M) said in the House: "I say again the External Affairs Minister Sardar Swaran Singh even after extensive publications in the papers on the US misbehaviour in Vietnam failed to understand that he was dealing with govt. of United States who always do double or multidealings..... we want the government to recognize the govt. of Bangladesh, give them material help so that other governments may be aware of our serious attitude towards Bangladesh, and take a lead from us"³. Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao (Cong.) elucidated the secret operation of the US policy all over the world which aimed even to hoodwink its own citizens. He remarked: "so you cannot expect from such a

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1. N.D. Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 45.
 2. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 192.
 3. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.IV, No.26, June 28, 1971, Col.130.

barbarous, faithless and unscrupulous friend a certain amount of understanding about our problems"¹. Almost all the members in the House were against the US arms supply to Pakistan. Dr. Henry Austin, Dinesh Singh, Manoharan and Chintamani criticised the US administration and described its attitude as "hostile and unfriendly". Even the Rightist members in the House developed antagonism towards the United States Administration. Piloo Mody, the leader of Swatantra Party, speaking on arms supply to Pakistan by USA remarked: "As far as the US government is concerned, it is not only deceiving us, it is deceiving its own people, as my honourable friend, Manoharan said - it is something that is inherent in their system: their government tries to deceive their Senate, the Senate tries to deceive the President and they all try to deceive the people"². He strongly urged the government to extend recognition which would in his opinion, yield purposeful result. R.D. Bhandare (Jan Sangh) and Prof. S.L. Saksena (Cong.) requested the Foreign Minister to use his good offices for an early extension of recognition to Bangla Desh.

Swaran Singh expressed concern over the American arms

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1. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.IV, No.26, June 28, 1971, Col.154-157.
 2. Ibid., Col. 181.

sales to Pakistan. But he was unwilling to accept the suggestion to grant recognition, for he wanted first to mobilise international opinion which was consistent with the unanimous resolution adopted by the House on March 31, 1971. The suggestion of Professor Rao, Bhagwat Jha Azad, and Krishna Menon to raise the issue in the United Nations was also rejected by him as he was not optimistic about the UN intervention as the problem related to internal conflict within a country. He further added "I think it is my duty to report to the House that I am completely dissatisfied with the explanations that have been given by the United States or by their spokesmen, and the Parliament is quite right in reacting in the manner in which they have done, that this is something definitely against our interest, and we cannot understand. Therefore I agree with the broad disapproval that has been shown by honourable members"¹. Prof. Madhu Dandavate said "There are moments in the life of a nation when the sovereign Parliament has to rise above the parties and partisan politics and project the conscience of the nation. That is what we did during the Chinese aggression, and repeated the same during the Pakistan aggression. Today is the occasion when that

1. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.IV, No.26, June 28, 1971, Col.240.

history must repeat itself, and the Bangla issue must not be talked about in terms of party politics, but looked at from the national perspective without any mud slinging either on the Treasury or opposition benches. Let us make it explicitly clear that the issue of Bangladesh recognition has become more sharp, and has been focussed to very great extent especially after the United States arms supply to Pakistan at a time when Bangladesh is involved in a grim struggle against Pakistan. Here again, it is not an isolated event, and I would like the House to realise that it is the outcome of the politics of the world powers to see that the balance of power in Asia is maintained. That is their Asian strategy. It is for this reason that America wants that there should not be an open war between Pakistan and India, but continuing tension between them. It is for this very reason that America does not desire the dynamic and virulent nation like Bangladesh to come up. Bangladesh has the potentiality of secular India, and if Bangladesh and secular India become allies, the entire balance of power in the Asian politics is likely to be completely destroyed. It is this balance of power that they want to restore"¹.

1. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.IV, No.30, July 2, 1971, Col.249.

The imprudence of the US government's pro-Pakistan policy was evident when the same came under vociferous criticism at the hands of the US Congressmen. Senator Church remarked: "we say in Vietnam that we are fighting for self-determination so that the people there can have the opportunity to choose their own government. Yet in Pakistan we continue to give support to an authoritarian clique, that conducts business by martial law, and forcibly deprives its own citizens of the right of self-determination even after a free and fair election"¹. Edward Kennedy pointed out "unfortunately, the face of America today in South Asia is not much different from its over the past years in South East-Asia. It is the image of an America comfortably consorting with an authoritarian regime. It is the image of an America citing the revolutionary past, and crowing about its commitment to self-determination, while it services military juntas that suppress change and ignore a people's aspirations It is argued that the continuation of military aid to West Pakistan somehow gives us leverage to constructively influence the military's policy in East Bengal. Well, where is that leverage? Where is leverage to stop to use

1. Congressional Records, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 107, Pt. 18, Wednesday, July 17, 1971, p. 24036.

of US arms which produce the refugees and civilian victims that we then must help support in India? ... where is the leverage to prevent our humanitarian aid from being turned into military equipment, when American relief boats are transformed into American gun boats? Why, if we have the leverage to influence the government of Pakistan, must our great nation assist in this shabby and shameful enterprise? It is time for Americans to ask their leaders. Just what kind of government is it that we seek to influence - and for what purpose?"¹

When Kissinger stopped at New Delhi in July 1971 while proceeding via Pakistan on a secretly planned China visit through Yahya's mediation, he had extensive talks with T.N. Kaul about the South Asian crisis. The discussions revealed unbridgeable disagreements, divergent thinking, and absence of any meeting point regarding different aspects of the Bangladesh crisis. Kissinger in fact warned, that precipitate action against Pakistan would only exacerbate the situation. If India attacked Pakistan, China might feel compelled to go

1. Kennedy's speech before the National Press Club in Washington DC cited in 'Two Puzzles of Indo-US Relations' by A. Mavalankar in 'Indo-US Relations: Dynamics of Change' Ed. P.M. Kamath (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi), pgs. 89-90.

to Pakistan's aid. The Soviet then would have to move against China¹. After Kissinger's conversation with Kaul, Washington could not claim ignorance regarding the seriousness with which India viewed the Bangladesh situation - while India could fairly charge the Nixon administration with duplicity, especially when Kissinger turned up in Beijing just days later². Kaul thought the episode typical of the administration's approach to India and South Asia. He later described Nixon and Kissinger as "vindictive and spiteful, callous and cruel, conceited and domineering", not to mention insensitive to other nations' feelings and pride³. The Indian government castigated Washington for abetting "genocide". Indian newspapers decried the American cold-heartedness, the Indian Express declared, "The Nixon administration has chosen to pursue a policy of deliberate cynicism in the face of a massive human tragedy"⁴.

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If America surprised the world by effecting a Sino-American rapprochement by using the good offices of Pakistan,

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1. H.W.Brands, India and United States: The Cold Peace (Twayne Publishers), p. 132.
 2. Ibid., p. 133.
 3. T.N.Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), p. 207.
 4. N.D.Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 50.

India too amazed the world by signing the Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation on Aug. 9, 1971. In the United States, the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty was viewed as a conclusive proof of the growing Soviet influence in India (and the lack of US influence) and of the increasing danger of a war on the subcontinent, precipitated by India with Soviet support, which would have dangerous, spillover possibilities¹. The Times stated that the treaty "strengthens Soviet influence in the second most populous nation in Asia - and the world - at the expense of the United States"². The editorial further declared "The incredible United States decision to keep supplying arms aid, and the aid to Pakistan in spite of the ruthless Pakistani crackdown on autonomy seeking Bengalis, and especially on Bengali Hindus, has handed Moscow a major foreign policy coup"³. At first the publicly expressed reactions of the Nixon administration to the Indo-Soviet Treaty were relatively mild and low-key but there can be no doubt that it regarded the signing of the treaty as an unanticipated and disturbing event that added to the dangers, and difficulties in the subcontinent and introduced further

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1. N.D.Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 48.
 2. Editorial, New York Times, Aug. 10, 1971.
 3. Ibid.

complications for the United States¹. Kissinger in white House years stated that "for all practical purposes the treaty gave India a Soviet guarantee against Chinese intervention if India went to war with Pakistan. By this action the Soviet Union deliberately opened the door to war on the subcontinent"².

Going into the background of the Indo-Soviet treaty, Christopher Van Hollen, in his celebrated article 'The Tilt Policy Revisited' writes: "a treaty between the Soviet Union and India had been under consideration for more than a year, but if there was any "bomb shell" that converted discussions into a formal text, it was undoubtedly the surprise announcement of Nixon's forthcoming visit to Beijing. The treaty gave Mrs. Gandhi who was being attacked at home for a weak-kneed policy toward Pakistan, a diplomatic triumph by providing India with an offset to what many Indians perceived to be an emerging Washington-Islamabad-Beijing axis. Against the background of continuing US arms supply to Pakistan, however small, and evidence that Islamabad was seeking a Chinese commitment to intervene militarily should India attack, the treaty provided the Gandhi government the reassurance it

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1. N.D.Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 49.
 2. Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 767.

needed - a warning to Beijing that any Chinese military moves against India might lead to a Soviet response"¹. Reiterating the same point Thomas Perry Thornton writes "The fact that China and United States had been Pakistan's prime support during 1971 raised Indian fears that the three countries were forming a strategic entente that would threaten India. The Indian decision to sign the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in Aug. 1971 (shortly after Kissinger visit) was a result of this concern, and the decision, in turn, raised further questions in the United States about the international role of India"².

The fact that public reaction of the US govt. to the Indo-Soviet treaty was controlled and mild reflects the low interest that US had in India. Kissinger, however, later in 'The white years' develops the theory describing the Indo-Soviet treaty as a 'bombshell' and charged that 'Moscow threw a lighted match into the powder keg'. This was perhaps an attempt by Kissinger to justify the White House's tilt policy.

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1. Christopher Van Hollen. "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia". Asian Survey 20 (April 1980), pp. 347-48.
 2. Thomas Perry Thornton. 'Relations in Nixon and Ford Years' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 99.

Putting the Indo-Soviet treaty in the right perspective Surjit Mansingh opines that it was less than an alliance and it need not have resulted in such a sharp deterioration in Indo-US relations, had it not been for the winter war¹.

At home the Indo-Soviet treaty was endorsed by most of the Parliamentarians. However Piloo Mody was the only opposition leader in the Lok Sabha to question the validity of the treaty: "I say that if this treaty was to help us vis-a-vis our problem regarding the refugees from Bangladesh, or if it was to help us regarding the aggression or the threat of aggression that we are suffering from Pakistan, that if this treaty was to help us to step up the arms supply from the Soviet Union and if this treaty was to help us to counter Chinese intrusion or intervention in case we decide to any action, we should welcome it ... But the more I thought about this treaty, the more intriguing it became, the language, the method, and the manner in which it was done. If you were to analyse the treaty, I find that there is very little that we stand to gain as a result of the treaty"². The level of

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1. Surjit Mansingh. India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982 (Sage Publications), p.89.
 2. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. VII, No.57, Aug. 10, 1971, Cols. 307-10.

animosity which had developed in the Indian psyche against the US could be gauged from the strongly worded reply of Dr. Henry Austin (Cong.) to Piloo Mody's suspicions. Dr. Austin said "I firmly believe that this is really an affirmation or rejuvenation of our policy of non-alignment. I would further say that there is a historic continuity in our foreign policy. China with her hegemonic aspiration and the USA with its imperialist motivations have been using Pakistan - a running dog of imperialism to scare us into submission by a threat of isolation. But we showed by this political mobilisation that we can never be blackmailed by any power, whether China or the USA or by their combination. That is the significance of this treaty"¹.

The last ditch attempt by Mrs. Gandhi to avert a military showdown in Asia by undertaking a tour of the United States failed to achieve its aim, the meeting of Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi instead generated acrimony and brought to the fore the mutual dislike of both the leaders. While describing the meeting of both the leaders, Kissinger later wrote "The Nixon-Gandhi conversation turned into a classic dialogue of the deaf. The two leaders failed to hear each other not because they did not understand each other but because they understood

1. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. VII, No.57, Aug. 10, 1971, Col. 314-17.

each other only too well Nixon had no time for Mrs. Gandhi's condescending manner" and Mrs. Gandhi was apparently turned off by what she regarded as Nixon's refusal to consider the realities of the South Asian crisis and the dilemmas facing India¹. In the post-dinner session at the White House State dinner, Mrs. Gandhi was quite blunt: "Our people cannot understand how it is that we who are the victims, we who are bearing the brunt and have restrained ourselves with such fortitude, should be equated with those whose action has caused the tragedy"². Nixon later wrote in his diary of Mrs. Gandhi's "duplicitous action toward us when she actually had made up her mind to attack Pakistan at the time she saw me in Washington and assured me she would not"³.

During the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, India for the first time used a different kind of diplomacy in the US. Indira Gandhi appealed to the American people above the head of their government. A massive consciousness-raising campaign was launched. Indian officials, academics, parliamentarians,

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1. Kissinger, White House years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 879-881.
 2. Richard Nixon, Public Papers of the President, 1971 (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1973), pp. 1079-80, 1083-84.
 3. Richard Nixon, R.N.: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlop, 1978), p. 531.

lawyers, and Bangladesh Awami League members descended on the US and talked wherever and whenever they were invited to do so. The American press, Congressmen and Senators and their staff were warmly welcomed in India and given all the facilities they needed¹.

In November the tempo of military support increased. The Bangladesh freedom fighters were becoming more aggressive in their cross-border forays, receiving artillery support from the Indian military. Late in the month Mrs. Gandhi authorized Indian forces to enter East Pakistan to "pursue" the Pakistani forces. Tensions mounted. An all-out Indian military assault against the East seemed imminent². The war formally broke out on the night of Dec. 3 when Pakistan attacked eight Indian airfields in the western part of the country and declared war on India the next day. Washington had already announced suspension of military sales to India on Dec. 2nd and on the 6th it froze the economic assistance including 87.6 million worth of aid already in the pipeline³. The State Deptt. Spokesman defending the action said: "The United States is not

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1. Surjit Mansingh. India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982 (Sage Publications), p. 90.
 2. Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications, 1993), p. 302.
 3. Ibid.

making a short term contribution to the Indian economy to make it easier for the Indian government to maintain its military efforts"¹

A series of Washington Special Action Group meetings (WSAG) were held secretly in the White House during the Indo-Pak war to assess the war situation and to provide military and moral support to Pakistan. That America had followed a policy of deliberate tilt vis-a-vis Pakistan was proved beyond doubt with the publication of the minutes of WSAG meetings by Jack Anderson in the New York Times and later as 'The Anderson Papers'. Other revelations including Ambassador Kenneth Keating's assertions to the press reinforced the impression of White House dissimulation. This loss of credibility undoubtedly contributed to later Congressional actions to curb the powers of the White House and to enhance the role of the Congress in formulating foreign policy².

Most of the WSAG meetings were chaired by the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In a WSAG meeting on Dec. 3, 1971 Kissinger said: "I am getting hell every half hour from the

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1. W. Norman Brown. The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (London, 1972), p. 225.
 2. Christopher van Hollen. "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia". Asian Survey 20 (April 1980), p. 359.

President that we are not being tough enough on India. He wants to tilt in favour of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise"¹. The American leaders hurt Indian feelings more and more by their open support to Pakistan. Both America and China supported Pakistan. America supplied arms to Pakistan through a third country. A secret message was flashed to L. Dean Brown, the American Ambassador in Jordan to authorise King Hussein to send several US supplied F-104 fighter planes to Pakistan even though it was contrary to the legalities of the US government². During 1971 Bangladesh became a burning international cause, complete with rock concerts to raise funds for the victims of repression, and within the United States it became an important political issue. Americans (especially in the Democratic Party) were uneasy with the Nixon-Kissinger form of realpolitik, and the US attachment to the Pakistani cause was seen as a particularly egregious example³. The Bangladesh issue thus became enmeshed in the polarization of attitudes that was

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1. The Anderson Papers on US Handling of Situation in Indian Subcontinent (Washington), 1971, p. 5.
 2. Ibid., p. 32.
 3. Thomas Perry Thorton. 'Relations in the Nixon-Ford years' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. 'The Hope and Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush' (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 98.

developing in the United States with regard to foreign policy. In terms of US-Indian relations, Bangladesh for a while considerably widened the gap between American public opinion that was sympathetic to India's role in the 1971 crisis and the American government that was highly critical of that role¹.

Those in the US who made a dispassionate review of the US South Asian Policy during 1971 could see the blunder and unreasonableness in the course US was following. Senator Church had remarked "I find it odd to understand why there is such a pro-Pakistani bias in American policies. India's position in the war which has now broken out is not only consistent with her professed ideals but it is also the position which is most likely to prevail. By showing such favouritism towards West Pakistan we side with probable loser and we forfeit the goodwill of the freedom fighters in East Pakistan as well as the people of India. Unless one believes that West Pakistan represents the wave of future on the sub-continent it is impossible to reconcile this government's bias towards Yahya Khan's government with the role in regard to the interest of

1. Thomas Perry Thorton. 'Relations in the Nixon-Ford years' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. 'The Hope and Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 98.

the United States"¹. Similarly Senator Kennedy pointed out: "Perhaps in the mind of many Americans is that thought that India has created this crisis. But the facts, Mr. President, show that this war began not last week with renewed military border crossings, nor last month with the escalating crossfire of artillery between India and Pakistan, this war began on the bloody night of March 25 with brutal suppression by Pakistani Army of the free elections it held in East Bengal. A review of the events since March 25 - a quick jostling of our memory - reminds us that the problem in South Asia is today and has been from the very beginning a political problem between the ruling military elite in West Pakistan and the Bengali opposition elected in East Bengal"². Senator Gallagher refuted the allegation (made by some of the Republicans) that India was heading for a virtual occupation of Bangladesh. He made clear in the Senate: "India has enough land and enough people. She does not need or want more. An independent Bangladesh could well cause grave problems within India because other national groups in certain territories may want to move towards the same thing, particularly in the strife - ridden

 1. SCOR, 26th Year, 1608th Meeting, Dec. 6, 1971, para 78, p. 9.

2. Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 117, Pt. 34, Dec. 7, 1971, p. 45125.

Indian state of West Bengal, where the vast majority of the refugees now are. I repeat, India moved into East Pakistan because it was the only way she could see to have the refugees stop their incredible drain on her economy and her very future"¹.

India had to face USA's hostility even in the United Nations. In the Security Council, US Rep. George Bush criticized India as responsible for the war and urged support for an immediate ceasefire. On Dec. 5 two resolutions introduced into the Security Council, calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops from each other's territory, were vetoed by the Soviet Union, but two days later a similar resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority (104 to 11, with 10 abstentions) by the General Assembly, where the veto does not apply². India was opposed to these resolutions, presumably because it was not willing to withdraw its forces from East Pakistan until it had forced the Pakistani troops there to surrender. Instead, it wanted the United Nations to declare Pakistan the aggressor. It was critical of the US position in the United Nations, and was

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1. Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 117, Pt. 35, Dec. 8-11, 1971, p. 45545.
 2. N.D. Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 52.

particularly indignant when the US representative George Bush in a television interview on Dec. 6 openly accused India of "Clear-cut-aggression"¹. The Times of India in its editorial stated: "The entire course of its policy in the third world has been a shameful betrayal of the principles by which the United States swears"².

Guided by the perception that "PM Gandhi was determined to reduce even West Pakistan to impotence" and that "Indian forces would proceed with the liberation of the Southern part of Azad Kashmir - the Pakistani part of Kashmir - and continue fighting until the Pakistani army, and air force were wiped out"³, the Nixon-Kissinger team thought it prudent to send the 'Enterprise' in the Bay of Bengal. The Task Group 74 was asked to proceed from Far East to The Bay of Bengal ostensibly to aid in the possible evacuation of US personnel in Dacca. The unstated mission of the Enterprise was to send a signal to the Indian and the Soviets - as Kissinger put it, "To give emphasis to our warnings about West Pakistan". The White House wanted to show the Chinese that, if they entered into a

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1. N.D.Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), pp. 52-53.
 2. The Times of India, Dec. 6, 1971.
 3. H.W.Brands, India and The United States: The Cold Peace (Twayne Publishers: Boston, 1990), p. 136.

relationship with the United States they could count on US steadfastness in times of trouble¹. That the stated 'Enterprise' mission - evacuation of trapped US citizens - was a cover-up for larger US designs was reflected in the views of Admiral Elmo-Zumwalt, then, the Chief of Naval Operations who pointed out that it was hardly credible to despatch a carrier group a distance of several thousand miles to evacuate a handful of US citizens. In any case the Americans had left East Pakistan by the time the Enterprise reached the Bay of Bengal². The American apprehensions about India's ambitions in the West Pakistan were misplaced. Once Mrs. Gandhi achieved her goal in the east, with the surrender of Pakistani forces, she quickly decided that continuing the war was not in India's interests³. Christopher Van Hollen maintains "There is no evidence for Kissinger's claim that India had a definite war aim to dismember West Pakistan. The Indian govt. shifted from support for a United Pakistan before the civil war to support for an independent Bangladesh because it judged that the uncertainties about the political orientation of a new nation

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1. Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 905.
 2. Elmo Zumwalt, On watch (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 367.
 3. Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989), p. 140.

on its flank would be offset by the restoration of stability in Eastern India through the return of the refugees. In the process, India could attain unquestioned supremacy in the subcontinent. Having achieved these objectives there would be no clear Indian interest in dismembering West Pakistan. The break-up of West Pakistan into four separate states would pose threats to the integrity of the Indian union, already facing fissiparous tendencies"¹.

The provocative naval deployment by the US was intended (1) to compel India divert both ships and planes to shadow the Task Force, (2) to weaken India's blockade against East Pakistan, (3) possibly to divert the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant from its military mission, and (4) to force India to keep planes on defence alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistan ground troops². The US policy deeply annoyed the Indians. In a scorching letter to Nixon, Indira Gandhi asserted that United States paid: "Lip service to the need for a political solution, but not a single worthwhile step was taken to bring about we are deeply hurt by the innuendoes

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1. Christopher Van Hollen. "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia". Asian Survey 20 (April 1980), p. 352.
 2. The Anderson Papers on US Handling of Situation in Indian Subcontinent (Washington), 1971, p. 39.

and insinuations that it was we who have precipitated the crisis ... we have not received, even to this day, the barest framework of a settlement which takes into account the facts as they are"¹. Nixon replied in a private letter to Mrs. Gandhi. He rebuked Indira for having "spurned" his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, claiming he opposed the resort to force when "statesmanship could turn the course of history away from war"².

Commenting upon the pro-Pakistan policy of Nixon, Dennis Kux writes "Far from a diplomatic victory, the whole affair proved an unnecessary and embarrassing diplomatic setback for the United States. Through their misreading of the crisis, and their pro-Pakistan bias, Richard Nixon, and Henry Kissinger succeeded in needlessly transforming a regional dispute into one which threatened to become a great power showdown. The main consequences were severe and long-lasting damage to US relations with India and enhanced Soviet influence with New Delhi. In the Indian eyes, US handling of the crisis especially sending the Enterprise towards the Bay of Bengal, provided tangible 'evidence' of US desire to thwart India's

1. New York Times, Dec. 16, 1971.

2. Krishnan Bhatia. Indira Gandhi (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 260.

regional hopes and aspirations. Vociferous pro-Soviet and anti-US elements have harped on the deployment of the Enterprise as a symbol of US hostility for over two decades"¹. N.D.Palmer wrote about the Enterprise episode in the following way "The Indians reacted with incredible vehemence, and excitement. To this day mention of the Enterprise and the task force will lead to virulent anti-American outbursts. This move by the Nixon administration marked the nadir of Indo-American relations and the scars that it created have never left the Indian psyche. One of the most significant and serious consequences was that for the first time even in informed Indian circles, the United States was regarded a major security threat to India"². A firm yet muted statement of the United States resolve to defend the integrity of West Pakistan would have accomplished the same purpose as sending a gunboat - a nuclear gunboat, at that. Until 1971, suspicions Indians had sometimes felt threatened by the United States. The threat, however, had always been indirect - arms to Pakistan or a more general 'neo-imperialism'. Now the United States was putting the pistol directly to India's head. American leaders

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1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage, 1993), p. 307.
 2. N.D.Palmer. *The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence* (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 55.

had previously sacrificed US-Indian relations to the perceived needs of superpower diplomacy. They would do so again. But the Enterprise episode seared a wound, a totally unnecessary one, in the Indian consciousness. The wound would heal only slowly. The scar would never disappear¹.

There is no indication that the Enterprise deployment had any immediate political or military impact on events in South Asia although it had adverse long term repercussions in terms of US interests. As part of a 1978 Brookings Institution study of US armed forces as a political instrument, a careful examination of the Enterprise deployment concludes that "it is important to emphasize that Soviet and Indian support for a cease-fire was not the result of US military pressure generated by Task Force 74"². Despite Kissinger's conclusion that skilled White House geopolitical diplomacy forced Mrs. Gandhi reluctantly to agree to a cease-fire, he produces no evidence to support this claim³. All indications suggest that she reached her decision on the basis of several complex

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1. H.W.Brands. The United States and India: The Cold Peace (Twayne Publishers), pp. 137-138.
 2. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen s. Kaplan. Force Without War (Washington. The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 200.
 3. Christopher Van Hollen. 'The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia'. Asian Survey 20 (April 1980)', pp. 355-56.

considerations, internal and external, but not as a result of pressure exerted by the Soviet Union at the US behest¹. Even though the actual employment of the task force against India was wildly unlikely, in fact, the Indians were supposed to see it as a threat. The net result of the affair was that the United States was seen as threatening but ineffective, as there is no convincing evidence that Indian policies were affected in any significant way by the cruise of the Enterprise².

The most obvious outcome of the war for the United States was the deep antipathy for it that American policies had generated in India. At all relevant levels of the society, Indians were appalled by US failure to understand India's position, by its partisanship for Pakistan, and by the implications of the Enterprise affair³. The termination of aid to both India and Pakistan was seen as unjust by both parties. The fact that many private Americans and such influential leaders as Senator Kennedy were almost as critical of US

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1. Christopher Van Hollen. The Tilt Policy Revisited. Nixon-Kissinger Geo-politics and South Asia. Asian Survey 20 (April 1980), p. 356.
 2. Thomas P. Thornton. 'US-Indian Relations in the Nixon and Ford Years', in Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly eds. The Hope and Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co.Pvt.Ltd., 1993), p.98.
 3. Ibid., p. 99.

government policy as the Indians provided some cushioning, but by the time the fighting ended in Dec. 1971, relations between the United States and India had plunged to previously uncharted depths¹.

The most serious longer-term legacy of the US tilt policy was its effect on the foreign, and defence policies of the Indian government, including the question of nuclear weapons option. Since the mid-1960s there had been a sharp debate in India as to whether the country should take the nuclear weapons route, particularly in view of China's nuclear capability. No firm decision had been made by 1971, but the events of that year proved a turning point in terms of Indian policy². The decision to send a task force into the Bay of Bengal headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise represented the first threat by the United States to use military force against India³. Proponents of nuclear weapons for India repeatedly pointed to the American carrier as the reason such a capability was needed. They advanced the

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1. Thomas P. Thornton. US-Indian Relations in the Nixon Ford Years, in Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly eds. The Hope and Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & ABH Publishing Co.Pvt.Ltd., 1993), p.99.
 2. Christopher Van Hollen. The Tilt Policy Revisited. Nixon-Kissinger Geo-politics and South Asia. Asian Survey 20 (April 1980), p. 359.
 3. Ibid., p. 360.

argument suggested by K. Subrahmanyam, that "had India possessed nuclear weapons the Enterprise would not have steamed into the Bay of Bengal during the India-Pakistan war in what appeared from New Delhi to constitute atomic gunboat diplomacy"¹. India might have gone nuclear in any event but the Nixon administration's tilt toward Pakistan including the decision to deploy the Enterprise, strengthened the hands of the nuclear advocates. It may have tipped the scales toward India's decision to explode a nuclear device in May 1974². Indo-US relations plummeted following the Bangladesh crisis. All the negative tendencies already present in the attitude of each to the other were reinforced and legitimised for the moment. In the US, right-wing opposition to governmental aid for the economic development of mixed economy countries like India found renewed expression. Nixon's abrupt termination of some \$82 million in authorised aid had no great effect on the Indian economy. It did, however, accelerate India's decision to ask for a dismantling of the huge and increasingly

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1. K. Subrahmanyam 'India: Keeping the Option Open' in Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus eds, Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1974), p. 122.
 2. Christopher Van Hollen. The Tilt-Policy Revisited. Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia. Asian Survey 20 (April 1980), p. 360.

unnecessary AID establishment in India, which was closed in Oct. 1973¹.

The post Bangladesh period surprisingly witnessed harrassment by India of that section of Americans - the academics - which had publicly supported it during 1971². The reluctance of Indian academics to be publicly associated with their American counterparts increased. Ambassador Daniel Moynihan was amazed at how few invitations to speak at Indian Universities were extended to him³. Among the American scholars in India in 1972 was the eminent Professor Norman Palmer. He gave the following concluding remark in a lecture "Let us hope that in future official relations will improve, but let us not forget that the main Indo-American encounter, an encounter which still lies in the future, will be an 'encounter between civilizations' to use Professor Tonybee's term. This encounter should be far more meaningful and far more satisfying, than any relations on official levels only"⁴.

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1. Surjit Mansingh. India's Search for Power (Sage, New Delhi), p. 91.
 2. Ibid., p. 92.
 3. Ibid., p. 92.
 4. Norman D. Palmer. 'Indo-American Relations in the Seventies', Harold Laski Lecture, Ahmedabad, April 1972, Publication No. 104.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIAN OCEAN : US POLICY
POSTURES, INDIA'S RESPONSE TO
US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE OCEAN
(1970s and 1980s)

CHAPTER III

THE INDIAN OCEAN : US POLICY POSTURES, INDIA'S RESPONSE TO US
NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE OCEAN (1970s and 1980s)

With the proposal to designate the Indian Ocean as a 'zone of peace' - a concept first mentioned in Cairo in 1964, then seriously advanced at the NAM summit in Lusaka in Sept. 1970, and subsequently endorsed by the United Nations in Resolution 2832 - India hoped to eliminate the superpower military presence from the Indian Ocean¹.

Although India had by 1961 transformed her navy from a small coastal force to a balance force consisting of one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, 17 destroyers, six mine-sweepers and one ocean-going tanker, and had augmented shore-based naval aviation², her strategic perception of the Indian Ocean was still limited. Despite the historic significance of the Indian Ocean to India's security and economic growth, India's defence policies had largely remained land-oriented because of her antagonism towards Pakistan. Also, the pervasive extra-regional influence prevented India from

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1. Robert W. Bradnock. India's Foreign Policy since 1971 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp. 90, 91.
 2. Vice Admiral Subimal Mookerjee, 'More Sinews for Indian Navy', 'The Times of India', Dec. 4, 1984.

pursuing an assertive naval diplomacy¹. India's border conflict with China in 1962 and the absence of a credible threat from the sea, led to a considerable emphasis on land forces². Perhaps it was India's own sense of vulnerability from an 'expansionist China' during the 1962 border war which introduced the extra-regional element into her Indian Ocean strategy³. Contrary to an earlier policy of opposition to superpower entrance into the region, India accepted US naval entry and a US pledge of military support against Chinese 'aggression'. Nehru even requested an American air umbrella fearing an escalation of conflict with China⁴. The visit of General Maxwell Taylor to India in Dec. 1963, followed immediately by units of the 7th Fleet, revealed the tacit support by India for US involvement in the Indian ocean⁵. The long term consequences of the US entry into the Indian Ocean, in terms of emulation by other powers, were seen as minimal and India's acceptance of US naval forces and military aid was characterised as consistent with non-alignment by the Indian

1. Rasul B. Rais. The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers (Vistaar Publications, New Delhi), p. 160.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Rashid Ahmad Khan, 'India's Indian Ocean Policy: Origins and Development', Strategic Studies, Vol.6, No.4 (Summer 1983), p. 55.

leaders¹. It was only during India's Dec. 1971 war with Pakistan, and after the creation of Bangladesh that India's strategic perceptions of the Indian Ocean and her future security role in South Asia underwent a radical change². The successful Indian blockade of the Bay of Bengal totally severed Pakistani supply-lines which contributed substantially to the rapid surrender of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan³.

For many decades prior to World War II, the Indian ocean was in effect a British lake⁴. After the withdrawal of the British Naval Power from the Indian Ocean 'Vacuum theory' gained prominence, and received attention. It postulated that the withdrawal of the British power from the Ocean would create a void which if not filled by the US and its allies would invite Soviet presence⁵. The non-aligned countries felt very strongly that if at all there was a vacuum, it should be filled by the littoral states, who alone would be responsible for the security of their water⁶. As Jasjit Singh points out

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1. Rasul B. Rais. The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers (Vistaar Publications, New Delhi), p. 161.
 2. Ibid., p. 159.
 3. Ibid., p. 159.
 4. N.D.Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 193.
 5. Inaugural Address by Admiral S.N.Kohli, the then Lt. Governor Mizoram at the International Seminar on the Indian Ocean by the University of Alld. on Feb. 12, 1983.
 6. Ibid.

"The fundamental truth must be recognised that if a 'power vacuum' is being created as a result of withdrawal of an extra-regional power, the logical, rational and stable solution is to seek to fill that vacuum by requisite indigenous capabilities of the states of the region and not by replacement of the extra regional power with the forces of other great powers, perhaps with greater capability, but essentially with lesser legitimacy except that generated through narrow, particular regime interests"¹.

The US has considerable economic interests in the Indian Ocean region. It imports a sizable percentage of oil from the Indian Ocean. It has been estimated that by the year 2025 some of the strategic materials available on land needed not only by the developed but by all countries will have been exhausted². Important developments in the Middle East in the past and in the Indian Ocean caused the US to increase its military presence to enable it to protect the oil fields in the Middle East, as also to counter the increasing Soviet influence (erstwhile). With the overthrow of the Shah of Iran

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1. Jasjit Singh. 'Regional Naval Powers: Retarded Growth' in World Focus, August 1986, p. 11.
 2. Inaugural Address by Admiral S.N.Kohli, the then Lt. Governor Mizoram at the International Seminar on the Indian Ocean by the University of Alld. on Feb. 12, 1983.

the US lost an important ally and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan took that region out of the US sphere of influence. With the growing wealth and political awareness among the people in the Middle East, there developed far less support for military alliances, the thrust being on procuring sophisticated arms for self-protection. Because of this it became necessary for powers like the US to maintain a permanent military presence rather than operate only through surrogates¹.

The Rapid Deployment Force was to be the main instrument of the US policy in and around the Indian Ocean. It was conceived in 1980 immediately after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan². The goal of the RDF was not only to stop the Soviet infiltration or invasion but also any kind of instability that might prove dangerous to US interests in the area. In the Persian Gulf the R.D.F. was intended explicitly to give the US the capability to force its way in and not wait for an invitation from a friendly government. To make the RDF fully effective it needed huge stockpiles of combat ready weapons within the area and base facilities for its aircrafts

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1. Inaugural Address by Admiral S.N.Kohli, the then Lt. Governor Mizoram at the International Seminar on the Indian Ocean by the University of Alld. on Feb. 12, 1983.
 2. Ibid.

and ships. Their most important base for effective deployment of the RDF was Israel. Israel was not only to maintain a pro-US power balance in West Asia, but was supposed to become an integral part of the American strategic design¹.

Diego Garcia was supposed to be the most important base for furtherance of US strategy in the Indian Ocean and also the most difficult stumbling block in any future plan to demilitarise the Ocean and establish a zone of peace here. Following the forward base concept possibly to fight another war, if necessary away from home, the US built over 60 naval bases in foreign countries in the post-war years. In 1970 the US declared its intention of converting Diego Garcia into a full-fledged naval base. The immediate reason for this development was the growing fear of communism following close on the heels of the Islamic resurgence in the Gulf².

The initial Indian response to the creation of BIOT³, and to the establishment of the US communication station on Diego Garcia was mild and low-key⁴. However, Sino-American

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1. Inaugural Address by Admiral S.N.Kohli, the then Lt. Governor Mizoram at the International Seminar on the Indian Ocean by the University of Alld. on Feb. 12, 1983.
 2. Ibid.
 3. British Indian Ocean Territory.
 4. Rasul B. Rais, The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers (Vistaar Publications, New Delhi), p. 161.

rapprochement and India's growing identity of strategic, and security interests with the Soviet Union substantially changed her Indian Ocean policy¹. Since the Lusaka Conference of Non-Aligned countries in 1970, India had actively supported all proposals declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Indian criticism had been specifically directed against the US naval facilities in the area². The Indians argued that it was the US that triggered a competitive race as far back as the mid-1960s when they commissioned the North-West Cape Very Low Frequency (VLF) communication station in Australia as a prelude to the deployment of nuclear submarines in the Indian ocean³. When Indians voiced criticisms of the US naval presence and buildup in the Indian ocean, they expressed particular apprehension regarding the alleged development of major American naval base on Diego Garcia⁴. The same became a kind of household word in India, although it was given little attention in the United States. To Indians it symbolised the dangerous intentions and activities of the United States in an

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1. Robert H. Donaldson, 'India: The Soviet Stake in Stability', Asian Survey, June 1972, p. 433.
 2. Rasul B. Rais. The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers (Vistaar Publications, New Delhi), p. 161.
 3. Ibid.
 4. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India. The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 197.

area far from America but all too close to India¹. One of the main demands of India and other littoral states that supported the proposal to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace was that all foreign bases in the Indian Ocean be dismantled, and the focus of this demand was almost always on Diego Garcia, sometimes to the exclusion of any facilities that the Soviet Union (erstwhile) had in the region². India had been highly critical of the US approaches, policies and activities in the Indian Ocean area, on both land and sea³. It had also been unhappy with some of the activities of the Soviet Union in the region, but in general it had been far less critical of these actions, even of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan⁴. India clearly regarded the US activities in the Indian Ocean as more threatening than those of the Soviet Union, although it advocated the removal of all naval forces and bases of the great powers from the entire area. The Soviet Union had been or had appeared to be in Indian eyes, more sympathetic with and more understanding of the Indian views on Indian Ocean matters than had the United States⁵. In the Parliament

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1. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India. The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 197.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid., p. 200.
 4. Ibid., p. 200.
 5. Ibid., pp. 200, 201.

frequent attacks were made on the United States by the members of Congress(I) as well as the Communist and other opposition parties. Many members of Parliament demanded that India strengthen and modernize its navy into a force capable of operating well beyond India's shores and capable of presenting at least some counter weight to the forces of the external powers as well as to the weaker Pakistan Navy¹. On April 4, 1983, a Congress (I) MP said in Lok Sabha that India needed at least three separate naval groups - one for the Bay of Bengal, a second for the Arabian Sea and a third for operations in a wider area of the Indian Ocean. "It is imperative", he argued, that "we gradually transform our grey water navy into a blue water one". In his view, this meant the creation of a third naval group with vessels capable of sustained operations for long periods, probably including nuclear-powered vessels with adequate combat capabilities, fire-power and air support². In the same debate in the Lok Sabha, a CPI member expressed alarm at the establishment by the United States of a new central command, with headquarters thousands of miles away in Florida, and with jurisdiction over a wide area of the Indian Ocean³.

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1. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India. The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 196.
 2. The Hindu, April 5, 1983.
 3. N.D. Palmer, op. cit., p. 196.

The creation of this new command, which was placed on par with the five existing commands - Atlantic, European, Pacific, Southern and Readiness - was explained by American spokesmen as being occasioned by the need for a restructuring and clarification of jurisdiction arising from the increasing importance of and commitments in the Indian Ocean region¹. Most Indian MPs and Indians generally, viewed the new development with disapproval and apprehension. They had been disturbed when in 1977 the United States announced the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The establishment of a major new command, into which the RDF would be integrated, added to their alarms. Many Indians agreed with the charge of the CPI MP that "there was every possibility of the central command intervening in any future conflict forced on India"².

There had hardly been any meeting point of Indian and American views on the Indian Ocean issue. M.V. Kamath in an article reflected strong Indian feelings on Diego Garcia. He stated "Diego Garcia is an arrow pointed at the heart of world

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1. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India. The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), pp. 196, 197.
 2. The Hindu, April 5, 1983. Manik Mehta, "Indian Ocean: Change of Command", India Today, March 31, 1983.

peace.... Under the circumstances, one can only conclude that Diego Garcia is aimed at the developing countries as much as it is against the Soviet Union"¹. However, American perception differed. As a US Information Service official observed in a report on a seminar on the Indian Ocean that was held in Allahabad in Feb. 1983. "The evolution of the American plans for Diego-Garcia have changed radically over time and it is futile to try to convince Indians that we did not secretly intend all along to turn the atoll into a major staging area complete with runways for B-52s and anchorage for ballistic missile submarines"². Further the United States did not regard the proposal to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace as a realistic or feasible one. Even if the superpowers could agree on the complete demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, as President Carter once suggested, it did not follow, that the Indian Ocean would thereby become a zone of peace. It would still be an area of internal, intraregional, interregional and international rivalries³ Apart from this, the United States had always been less than enthusiastic about the proposal to

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1. M.V.Kamath, "A Tale of Chicanery", Indian Express Magazine, April 10, 1983.
 2. "Allahabad Seminar on Indian Ocean" (a memorandum issued by the US Embassy New Delhi, March 4, 1983).
 3. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India. The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 201.

hold an international conference to consider ways and means of implementing the Dec. 1971 General Assembly resolution, for it considered that such a conference would be long on denunciations of the United States and short on actual achievement¹. The intransigence of the superpowers especially the United States was not the only reason for failure to make substantial progress on the implementation of zone of peace concept. The absence of unanimity of opinion among the littoral states was another reason. Some of the smaller Indian Ocean states publicly expressed their apprehension of the consequences of the complete withdrawal of the superpowers from the Ocean. They perceived danger from the larger states of the region especially India³. Robert W. Bradnock felt, that India's position was ambiguous, not so much because of its emphasis on removing the American naval presence as because of its concern to build up its own naval presence to a level commensurate with its perceived regional power requirements³. Bradnock further stated "However

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1. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India. The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 201.
 2. Ibid., Robert W. Bradnock. India's Foreign Policy Since 1971 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp. 90, 91.
 3. Robert W. Bradnock. India's Foreign Policy Since 1971 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp.90,91.

defensive that growing capability may be, it is a capability that some of India's neighbours fear, and do not wish to be excluded from consideration in the Indian Ocean Zone of peace proposals"¹. Another cause of resentment of the western powers was on account of their perceived reluctance of India to acknowledge any legitimate interest in the Indian Ocean region other than their own². However such arguments only tended to dilute the gravity of threat India faced from the entry of extra-regional powers in the Ocean at the peak of superpower rivalry. Not only India but other littoral countries too faced threat to their security with the militarisation of the Indian Ocean. The fact is that when powerful naval units and task forces are permanently deployed by countries in far-away waters in a manner that appears to be the very anti-thesis of international tranquillity and harmony they cannot but be looked upon with suspicion³. Naval task forces because of their inherent mobility constitute a powerful projection of military might. That is why the non-aligned countries of the

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1. Robert W. Bradnock. India's Foreign Policy Since 1971 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp.90,91.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Inaugural Address by Admiral S.N.Kohli, the then Lt. Governor Mizoram at the International Seminar on the Indian Ocean by the University of Allahabad on Feb. 12, 1983.

Indian Ocean were exercised over the threat posed to their national security from the high seas. They never forgot that the powers that dominated and colonised them for centuries came to the area via the high seas. They also remembered that even in the decades since the second world war, there have been several glaring instances of naval might being used by the Big powers to exert military pressure in almost every ocean. The concern expressed by nations who did not wish to return to gun boat diplomacy, and domination by military forces was therefore indisputably legitimate¹.

During the period of hectic superpower naval activity in the Indian Ocean, the big power military presence posed an important challenge to the Afro-Asian countries. Commander V. Koithana had suggested the strengthening of the Indian Navy. He opined "we can gain a good deal of political mileage by parading our ships along the Indian Ocean periphery as credible symbols of our power and purpose. We should also attempt to foster defence relationship with the Indian Ocean nations"². However India's defensive postures and efforts to

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1. Inaugural Address by Admiral S.N.Kohli, the then Lt. Governor Mizoram at the International Seminar on the Indian Ocean by the University of Allahabad on Feb. 12, 1983.
 2. Commander V. Koithana, "India and the Indian Ocean", USI Journal of India (July-Sept., New Delhi, 1975), p. 233.

demilitarise the Ocean were misinterpreted as her ambitions to develop as the dominant power in the region. As Rasul B. Rais stated "India's assertive opposition to the naval presence of the superpowers is indicative of her anxieties and ambitions to emerge as a major power in the region India's advocacy of the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean by the superpowers is an essential element of her goal to establish naval supremacy"¹.

When no progress could be achieved in ending the stalemate in the Indian Ocean situation, the realization dawned that it would be unrealistic to expect the superpowers to agree to complete demilitarisation in view of their high stakes in the Ocean. In a book on the Indian Ocean published in 1977 K.P.Misra suggested "Let the littoral countries for a while consider the presence of the superpowers as something undesirable but inevitable while accepting their presence let them endeavour to circumscribe their level of armaments which is tension-generating process ... In this exercise they should try to secure the cooperation of the superpowers also"². K.D. Malviya in a letter to The Times of

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1. Rasul B. Rais. The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers (Vistaar Publications, New Delhi), p. 161.
 2. K.P. Misra. Quest for an International Order. The Indian Ocean (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1977), p. 106.

India in early 1980 said, "the Indian Ocean, much less the Gulf, can scarcely be treated as a zone of peace in the present circumstances of mounting tensions"¹. B. Vivekanandan in his article 'The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects' wrote "It is quite obvious that the attempt being made by certain countries to insulate the Indian Ocean artificially from the world strategic map seems to be an exercise in futility. It makes more sense to strive for a balancing presence of various navies at a minimum level in the Indian Ocean so that no single navy would be in a position to pose a real danger to the stability and security of any littoral state in the region while the countries concerned are reassured that their vital interests there are not jeopardized by the dominance of any adversary in the region"².

In the Indian Ocean region outside South Asia neither India nor the United States was able to exert much influence on the other, in spite of sustained efforts and critical pronouncements³. The same observation could be made about the Indian Ocean itself as was demonstrated by an examination of

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1. K.D.Malaviya, Letter in The Times of India, Feb. 8, 1980.
 2. B.Vivekanandan. 'The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace Problems and Prospects'. (Asian Survey, Vol. XXI, No.12, Dec. 1981), p. 1248.
 3. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India. The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 207.

the conflicting views and policies regarding the US naval buildup in the Indian Ocean and the issue of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace¹. However, in the present day scenario Indian Ocean has lost the urgency and the significance it used to have in the context of cold-war within the framework of the bipolar system. Even with the augmented and modernised naval capability there is a limit upto which India can demonstrate its power in the Indian Ocean, more so, when filling the 'power vacuum' was never India's objective. It is nearly impossible for India to exercise its policies and perform its military role in the Indian Ocean in a manner which is similar to that of USA, Great Britain and Russia. However, India can never remain indifferent to the exploitation by outside powers of the natural resources of the Ocean in its vicinity.

Imputation of ulterior motive to India, in the sense of branding its assertive role in the Indian Ocean as attempt to establish itself as the regional power, is unfair. India has every right to be assertive in matters of Indian Ocean, as it has always played a positive role in the same and can ignore the activities in the Ocean only at its own and neighbour's peril. It was India's positive role which obliged it to come

1. N.D.Palmer. The United States and India. The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), pp. 207, 208.

to the rescue of Mohd. Gayoom's govt. in Maldives when the same was attempted to be toppled by a band of foreign mercenaries. Even today if our navy does not remain vigilant in the Gulf of Mannar, the consequences of the LTTE depredations on Tamil Nadu would be more disastrous. The security of some ports of India which are of strategic importance but separate from the mainland, such as Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshwadweep, cannot be overlooked. A constant vigil is required to be maintained in respect to their security. India should evolve a long and short term strategy in respect to the Indian Ocean. But the most effective manner in which littoral states can prevent Big-power meddling is to solve any existing difference bilaterally or with a regional approach. The outsiders who maintain military forces in the area must never be given a chance to fish in the troubled waters¹.

1. Inaugural Address by Admiral S.N.Kohli, the then Lt. Governor Mizoram, at the International Seminar on the Indian Ocean by the University of Allahabad n Feb. 12, 1983.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOVIET-AFGHAN IMBROGLIO, PAKISTAN FACTOR, INDO-US POLITICAL, DEFENCE AND SECURITY TIES (1980-1990)

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THE SOVIET-AFGHAN IMBROGLIO, PAKISTAN FACTOR, INDO-US
POLITICAL, DEFENCE AND SECURITY TIES (1980-1990)

When the Soviet Union existed, it was an important factor for the US in its bilateral relations with India just as Pakistan was, and continues to be in New Delhi's interaction with the US. If the US-Soviet and Indo-Pak rivalries had not so often intersected the US-India bilateral ties, a more mature, stable and firm Indo-US relations would have emerged. The Indo-US relations have been marked by periods of relative goodwill and mutual understanding alternating with phases of disappointment and irritation on the part of one or the other of the two parties and often of both¹. The Carter Presidency saw the pendulum swing both ways - from a high degree of amity and shared aspirations in the initial years to considerable tension on both sides towards the end. The dividing line was, in almost all respects, sharp: the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in late Dec. 1979².

1. Robert F. Goheen. 'US Policy Toward India During the Carter Presidency' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. *The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush* (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 121.

2. Ibid.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Pakistan almost at once gained greatly heightened importance in Washington's calculations as a frontline state and potential block to further southerly extensions of Soviet influence and power¹. The Carter administration immediately assured Pakistan that the United States would hold to its commitment of support under the defence treaty signed between the two countries in 1959². And in General Zia of Pakistan, Carter's officials found a self-confident, anti-Soviet hard-liner at least as determined to contest the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as their converted selves³. But in the present military association a new twist was added, for Pakistan became the funnel through which Washington supplied aid to the Afghan resistance, the mujahideen. Recognizing his country's importance to the United States, Zia set his price high. He got it: not only American weapons and money but American acquiescence in Pakistan's continued pursuit of nuclear

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1. Robert F. Goheen. 'US Policy Toward India During the Carter Presidency' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. *The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush* (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 131.
 2. Facts on File, Dec. 31, 1979, p. 974.
 3. Robert F. Goheen, op. cit. p. 131.

weapons¹. That India was put off by Carter's cultivation of Pakistan startled no one. That (Indira) Gandhi, as suspicious of Washington as ever, denounced it was equally predictable. And that her denunciation provoked an anti-Indian backlash in the United States was fully in line with the precedent².

In India, the initial US assurances of support to Pakistan brought an almost immediate, knee-jerk response. The American ambassador was promptly summoned to the Ministry of External Affairs to receive an expression of Indian concern at the possibility of renewed US arms supply to Pakistan³. While Indian officials condemned the resumption of American military aid to Pakistan, they refused to join the majority of the international community in labelling the Russian aggressor in Afghanistan⁴. The foreign minister of the outgoing government on Jan 1, 1980, issued a statement saying that India "did not wish to sit in judgement" on the Soviet move into Afghanistan but expressed the hope that the Soviets will withdraw as they

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1. H.W. Brands, India and The United States: The Cold Peace (Twayne Publishers: Boston, 1990), p. 167.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Robert F. Goheen. 'US Policy Toward India During the Carter Presidency' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 131.
 4. H.W. Brands, op. cit., p. 168.

have promised". The statement reinforced the impression that India seemed more concerned about the US readiness to arm Pakistan than about the USSR's forceful entry into Afghanistan, threatening though that was to regional stability¹. Mrs. Gandhi on Jan 5, still not in office, in a press interview criticized the Soviet invasion but balanced that criticism by pointing to the US buildup of naval forces in the Indian Ocean as a possible contributing cause².

The Indian UN Representative Mishra delivered the following statement on Jan 11 1980, "we are against the presence of foreign troops, and bases in any country. However, the Soviet government has assured our government that its troops went to Afghanistan first at the request of the Afghan government on Dec. 26, 1979, and repeated by his successor on Dec. 28, 1979. And we have been further assured that Soviet troops will be withdrawn when requested to do so by the Afghan government. We have no reason to doubt assurances, particularly from a friendly country like the Soviet Union

1. Robert F. Goheen. 'US Policy Toward India During the Carter Presidency' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 131.

2. Facts on File Jan. 11, 1980, p. 11.

with whom we have many close ties"¹. Ambassador Goheen met with President Jimmy Carter the afternoon Mishra spoke in the UN General Assembly. On learning of the Indian statement, Carter was livid. Goheen calmed him down saying "we don't really know the circumstances. Let me go back to New Delhi and report before we do anything about this". At the State Department according to the then India Country Director Howard Schaffer, "The statement hit people like a ton of bricks. When we first heard the wholesale acceptance of the Soviet line, we couldn't believe it". As in the case of Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, India chose to stand apart from the world community in not condemning the Soviet Union's use of force against another country².

On returning to New Delhi, Goheen spoke frankly to Mrs. Gandhi. He stressed, "what a devastating statement it had been from the American point of view and what a terrible backlash it had caused in the United States". When the Prime Minister responded, "Oh it wasn't that bad," the Ambassador countered "Oh yes it really was". Goheen made similar points to Parthasarathy. The envoy told Parthasarathy, "The terrible

1. Text from India Today, Jan. 18th, 1980.

2. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications, 1993), pp. 367, 368.

statement misjudged the United States, and it really wasn't in India's interests in siding so openly with the Russians". Like Mrs. Gandhi, Parthasarathy tried to explain away the remarks as less serious than Goheen suggested¹.

Western observers noted that, as usual, finely calculated considerations of personal and national self-interest lay behind Mrs. Gandhi's actions. A writer in Forbes magazine suggested that by following Moscow's line, New Delhi hoped to keep the large and vocal Indian Communist party under control. A foreign diplomat quoted in US News and World Report contented that Mrs. Gandhi once again was using the Soviet Union as a strategic counterweight to Pakistan. "Gandhi clearly worries about superpower competition moving closer to India and would like to see the Soviets out of Afghanistan on that score", this unnamed source asserted. "But it's just as obvious she isn't nearly as concerned about the actual presence of Russian troops there as she is about potential American or Chinese military aid to Pakistan". To offset the aid to Islamabad, Mrs. Gandhi in May 1980 agreed to a new weapons deal with Moscow, which provided for the sale on highly concessionary terms of \$1.6 billion in East bloc

1. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications, 1993), p. 368.

arms¹.

Commenting on the Afghanistan problem Partha S. Ghosh and Rajaram Panda in their article 'Domestic support for Mrs. Gandhi's Afghan Policy: The Soviet Factor in Indian Politics', observed, "In the non-aligned movement and the Islamic world the mood was generally hostile to the Soviet Union for its interventionist policy in Afghanistan and India's stand was strongly resented"². India seemed to be more disturbed by the prospect of a renewal of substantial US military aid to Pakistan than by the new threats posed by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan³. Partha Ghosh and Rajaram Panda further wrote, "The issue of a rearmed Pakistan assumed significance while the Soviet role in Afghanistan, since it did not directly affect India's security perceptions, became secondary: it was not Afghanistan but a rearmed Pakistan that was the crux of the issue"⁴. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shocked the world. While India was not immune to this shock and in fact

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1. Forbes, 12 March 1984, US News & World Report, 16 June 1980.
 2. Partha S. Ghosh and Rajaram panda. "Domestic Support for Mrs. Gandhi's Afghan Policy: The Soviet Factor in Indian Politics", Asian Survey 23 (March '83), p. 262.
 3. N.D.Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 87.
 4. Partha S. Ghosh and Rajaram Panda, op. cit., p. 265.

disapproved of the Soviet action and wanted the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan forthwith, the Soviet intrusion into a nearby country did very little to change the prevailing Indian images of either the Soviet Union or the United States¹. From the US perspective, the Indian reactions to the Soviet moves in Afghanistan revealed at best a deplorable, and alarming ambivalence and at worst a decided pro-Soviet bias. From the Indian perspective, the US reactions added unnecessarily to India's security problems and raised the level of international tensions unduly².

However, it would be naive to assume that India had followed a policy of outright exoneration of Soviet actions. India may have hesitated in outright and public condemnation of Soviet invasion, but it conveyed to the Soviets several times its reservations regarding Soviet military adventure. By the end of January 1980 India's tone was a little sharper. Foreign Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao said, "we are deeply concerned and vitally interested in the security, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of this

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1. N.D.Palmer, *The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence* (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 87.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

traditionally friendly neighbour of ours"¹. The Joint Declaration signed with French President Giscard d'Estaing on 27 January said, "the use of force in international relations and intervention or interference in internal affairs of sovereign states are inadmissible"². The Chief Editor of the Times of India, Girilal Jain may have reflected official views when he wrote that the Soviet explanation of marching 'its divisions into Afghanistan in response to pressing requests by a friendly government in distress is so flimsy and implausible that the Kremlin should never have used it',³. When Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrived in New Delhi on 12th Feb. 1980, Mrs. Gandhi told him that she found the Soviet intervention unacceptable. Narasimha Rao conveyed to him India's embarrassment and inability to support Soviet action. They both reminded him that relationships in the region should be based on non-interference, and peaceful coexistence. The joint communique was delayed, and when finally issued it contained no reference to Afghanistan. N.D. Palmer observed "One did not have to be a profound student of diplomatic

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1. Narasimha Rao to Parliament, 23 Jan. 1980, Times of India 24 Jan 1980.
 2. MEA, Report 1979-80, Appendix XlIII, Indo-French Joint Declaration, 27 Jan 1980.
 3. Times of India, 12 Feb. 1980.

practice to realize that the absence of such a reference was convincing proof that the two sides could not reach an agreement on the issue"¹. Mr. Narasimha Rao when he visited Moscow in June 1980 again conveyed India's distress very strongly².

Indian response to the Soviet action was misjudged in the US on account of a number of reasons. India's overemphasized concern about Pakistan's arming by USA masked India's concern about Soviet entry into Afghanistan thereby creating the impression that India perceived no threat from Soviet aggression but only from US-Pak relationship. This feeling obliged the US to infer that India was whitewashing Soviet action. It is true that Mrs. Gandhi avoided an outright public denunciation of USSR but 'her refusal to be drawn vocally into the cold war on her doorstep, combined with her determination not to let bilateral ties be adversely affected by this latest episode in superpower rivalry, led her to a policy of quiet remonstrance with Soviet leaders'³. Another limitation on India's power and influence during 1980 was the inadequacy of

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1. N.D.Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 88.
 2. Surjit Man Singh, India's Search for Power: Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy (Sage), p. 155.
 3. Ibid.

its public relations machinery which helped the pro-Soviet groups as well as anti-Indira Gandhi groups to project inaccurate images of her policy on Afghanistan to suit their own political purposes.¹

However the US suspicion regarding India's stand was not without any basis. Indian attitude of moderating Soviet criticism with US denunciation was sufficient reason for Washington to doubt Indian motives. It was natural for Carter to become furious when India abstained from voting in the General Assembly on the resolution to condemn USSR's invasion and presented a fatuous statement balancing mild criticism of the USSR with an implication of US provocation². However calmer reflection in the following weeks and months restored a measure of understanding and tolerance. The fact came to be recognized and appreciated that Mrs. Gandhi firmly, though quietly, had rejected high-level Soviet importuning for endorsement of the USSR's actions in Afghanistan - including a visit from Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko sent to Delhi

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1. Surjit Man Singh, India's Search for Power: Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy (Sage), p. 156.
 2. Robert F. Goheen. 'US Policy toward India During the Carter Presidency' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 132.

during Feb. 12-14, for that purpose¹. Still her unwillingness to join the United States in direct and public condemnation continued to rankle in Washington². However, as early as 18th Jan., 1980, India had started diluting its stand on the Afghanistan issue. After meeting with British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington on 18th Jan., she commented to the press, "I don't think that any country is justified in entering another country"³. In an interview with Time magazine, she said she 'disapproved' of the Soviet action in Afghanistan⁴. To soften the public criticism, the Prime Minister often added that the Soviets intervened only after Pakistan started arming Afghan rebels against the Kabul government⁵.

The Carter administration was not insensitive to India's concern about the US arms to Pakistan and in order to assuage India's feelings on that score decided to send Clark Clifford

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1. Robert F. Goheen. 'US Policy toward India During the Carter Presidency' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold a. Gould eds. The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 132.
 2. Ibid.
 3. New York Times, 19th January 1980.
 4. Time, 21st January 1980.
 5. Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 183.

to New Delhi¹. Mrs. Gandhi appreciated Clark Clifford's visit, she found in Clark Clifford a good listener, and spelled out her position: if the United States rearmed Pakistan, India's position would be endangered thereby limiting New Delhi's ability to influence Moscow. Mrs. Gandhi also tried to partially absolve the Soviets of their guilt by citing foreign interference in Afghan affairs². In the post Mrs. Gandhi meet press briefing Clifford stated the goal of both the governments to be the same to ensure the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan. The Indians, however, believed that negotiation, and positive persuasion would be more effective. Referring to the US arms for Pak Clifford said, "we understand this is not a popular move with the Indian government, and yet with the gravity of threat we believe it is a helpful policy for us to follow"³.

The same event (Soviet intervention) was responded to differently by Washington and New Delhi according to individual perceptions of security dimension. For Washington, it was

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1. Robert F. Goheen. 'US Policy toward India During the Carter Presidency' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. *The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush* (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 132.
 2. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 369.
 3. *Washington Post*, 1 Feb. 1980.

as if the 19th century Great Game for the control of Afghanistan between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia was being replayed. Opposing Moscow was the force of Afghan nationalism embodied in the tough tribal fighters. Three times, the Afghan tribesmen had thwarted British efforts to dominate their country. Battling a similar attempt by the Russians in 1980, the Afghan guerrillas were soon receiving covert military help from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China and others, although not initially from the United States. Washington had, nonetheless, full sympathy and support for the Afghan cause, and for the country through which most external help flowed-Pakistan¹.

In New Delhi, the prevailing view was that the revival of US military aid to Pakistan posed a greater threat to Indian interests than the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Having bested the Pakistanis in 1965 and 1971, the Indians no longer feared their neighbour militarily. They were still viscerally opposed to the United States resuming a role as the principal arms supplier to Pakistan, thereby reestablishing itself as an important player in the subcontinent's security scene². The Indian Ministry of External Affairs standard

1. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p.370.

2. Ibid.

response on arms to Pakistan made this clear - "Neither the quality nor the quantity of the arms mattered; it was the attitude that caused concern"¹.

The wisdom of arms supply by US to Pak during the mid-1950s was subjected to questioning in some quarters in Washington. But with the changed strategic environment in 1980s, Indian complaints regarding US arming of Pakistan mostly went unheeded. However, the Carter administration did not write India off entirely. Washington reflected some changes in its arms policy, making it more accommodating for India in order to reduce the possibility of New Delhi getting closer to Moscow². The administration had earlier refused permission to Sweden to sell its General Electric-powered Viggen fighter to India, Washington now encouraged New Delhi to consider arms purchases from US companies. An Indian military team visited US in 1980 to explore procurement of large numbers of Tow anti-tank missiles and long range howitzers, with the package perhaps totalling \$300 million. The Carter administration similarly reversed its earlier action to disapprove the use of an advanced US electronic

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1. New York Times, 1 Feb, 1980.
 2. Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), pp. 370, 371.

guidance system in the Jaguar aircraft India was buying from Great Britain¹.

however, the strains which had developed in the Indo-US bilateral relations could not be dismissed with adhoc posture changes in the foreign policy. "The bloom had gone off the US-Indian relationship" as Robert Goheen put it and continued "From February 1980 on through the remainder of the year, once the frenzied, sometimes confused, initial reactions to the Afghanistan situation had quieted, the relations of the two countries can only be described as arm's length and proper. On each side there was, at the least, a trace of suspicion of the other's credibility and goodwill. At the same time, both saw more reasons to maintain a tolerable relationship - even under the strains of the Afghanistan and Tarapur issues - than to allow a clean rift"².

The ascent to power of Jimmy Carter and Morarji Desai had generated optimism regarding the advent of a period of sustained improved relations. Such hope was reinforced when India declared its policy to be one of genuine non-alignment

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1. New York Times, 2 Feb. 1980, Washington Post, 2 Feb. 1980.
 2. Robert F. Goheen. 'US Policy Toward India During the Carter Presidency' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 133.

and Washington distanced itself from Pakistan. Both reaffirmed common faith in democracy and human rights. However domestic developments in India and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan sealed the fate of Indo-US relations¹.

The replacement of Jimmy Carter by Ronald Reagan changed Washington's international policies less than Republicans liked to think, by Carter's last year in office, the Democratic President had essentially adopted the present dangerists' agenda². The Reaganites led in the foreign policy area by Secretary of State Alexander Haig had little interest in India - except as a battleground in the contest with the Soviet Union and its allies. The new team had scant sympathy for India, disliking above all New Delhi's close links with the Soviets and its stance on Afghanistan. Though the Republicans were back in the White House but not Richard Nixon. Their differences with India were spawned by geopolitics, not emotional antagonism.³

The major tension between India and US during Reagan's regime developed on account of Washington's decision to supply

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1. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p.374.
 2. H.W.Brands, *India and The United States: The Cold Peace* (Twayne Publishers: Boston, 1990), p. 168.
 3. Dennis Kux, *op. cit.*, pp. 379, 380.

\$2.5 billion economic-cum-military aid - including 40 F-16 fighter planes - to Pakistan¹. The F-16s in particular triggered a fresh round of criticism from India. The Indians complained that Pakistan had no intention of using its American weaponry against communists. Islamabad would target India². Mrs. Gandhi said "she was worried that the American shipments were creating a situation where everybody is drifting toward war"³.

Even before Under Secretary of State James Buckley reached an agreement in Islamabad on 15th June 1981 on the \$2.5 billion arms cum economic aid proposal including the F-16s, India had tried to lobby against US arms aid to Pakistan by sending to Washington in April 1981 two envoys: G. Parthasarathy and Eric Gonsalves. Indian concerns were rejected out of hand by Secretary of State Haig who maintained that US help to Pakistan was in the interest of "global peace and stability"⁴.

Unimpressed by New Delhi's complaints, after the actual

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1. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 382.
 2. H.W.Brands, *India and The United States: The Cold Peace* (Twayne Publishers: Boston, 1990), p. 168.
 3. US News and World Report, 21 Dec. 1981.
 4. Dennis Kux, *op. cit.*, pp. 382, 383.

agreement in June 1981 providing for US arms cum economic aid to Pakistan, Washington responded bluntly, "our aid to Pakistan is not aimed at India. The USA is not fuelling an arms race"¹. Under Secretary Buckley expressed Washington's overall exasperation with India in congressional hearings on the Pakistan aid package. "I am not an international psychologist", Buckley declared, "I honestly don't understand the Indian reaction. But the US cannot have its actions and decisions commandeered by considerations that do not have any factual basis"². The main impact of Indian complaints was damage to New Delhi's credibility. A senior State Deptt. official stated "The Soviet army is standing on the marchlands of India and they are screaming about F-16s, not the Soviets in Afghanistan. People on the India desk could explain how India looked at things, the historic perspective of Pakistan, but the people higher up who made policy had much greater difficulty in understanding India's response"³. The Indians on their part were justified in having complaints. The US action of giving no guarantee that Pakistan would refrain from using

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1. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 383.
 2. *The Statesman*, 18th Sept. 1981.
 3. Interview with Ambassador Haward Schaffer, 17th Dec. 1990 cited in *Estranged Democracies*, p. 384.

US supplied arms against India caused additional resentment in New Delhi though the new US stance had the virtue of candour.¹ The experience of the 1960s showed that guarantees were meaningless and only prompted recriminations in the event of India-Pakistan conflict².

Frictions between Washington and New Delhi continued to mount during the summer of 1981. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Ambassador to the United Nations clashed with Indian leaders regarding US South Asia policy during a 24-27 August visit to New Delhi. When Kirkpatrick denied that Pakistan arms aid posed a problem for India, Mrs. Gandhi publicly "disagreed" with her assessment³. Jeanne Kirkpatrick closed her visit to New Delhi by pronouncing US-Indian relations estranged. Kirkpatrick had made a crucial distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The former she claimed might in time be persuaded to reform, the latter were irredeemable⁴. The authoritarian labelling of Pakistan, a country whose government only a decade earlier had engaged in

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1. Interview with K.R. Narayanan, 21 Jan 1991 cited in *Estranged Democracies*, p. 384.
 2. Interview with Howard Schaffer, 17 Dec. 1990 cited in *Estranged Democracies*, p. 384.
 3. Facts on File, 4th Sept. 1981, p. 631.
 4. H.W.Brands, *India and The United States: The Cold Peace* (Twayne Publishers: Boston, 1990), p. 169.

genocide against its own people, particularly annoyed Indians, who were more convinced than ever of US hypocrisy¹.

A dispute over US diplomatic personnel made matters worse. New Delhi refused to accept the assignment of longtime foreign service officer George Griffin to the American embassy, on grounds that he was a CIA operative. US officials blamed Soviet disinformation specialists for originating the ruckus; one observer characterized it as a "masterful campaign". Washington tit-tatted by rejecting an Indian envoy². This Indo-US disagreement regarding the posting of diplomats led Dennis Kux remark "The Griffin incident pointed up an important fact of life in Indo-US relations; the ability of the pro-Soviet lobby to stir up trouble between Washington and New Delhi. In harness with friends in Indian government and media circles, the Soviet Embassy for many years was able to mount disinformation campaigns against US interests, such as the successful effort to discredit Griffin. No episode by itself was earthshaking, but cumulatively disinformation by the Soviets and their Indian friends added to US problems in India, in particular, strengthening suspicions that the CIA

1. US News and World Report 21 Dec. 1981, New York Times, 27 Aug. 1981.

2. H.W.Brands, India and The United States: The Cold Peace (Twayne Publishers: Boston, 1990), p. 169.

was interfering in Indian internal affairs"¹.

One factor which remained predominant in Indo-US relations was that India perceived greater threat from US-Pak arms relationship than the deployment of the Soviet troops on the western border of the subcontinent. One reason for this suspicion was as N.D.Palmer notes "The United States did not make the efforts to seek understanding and support of its policies that the Soviet Union made. Indians interpreted this as further proof of the low regard that the United States had for India"². William J. Barnds in his article 'The United States and South Asia: Policy & Process' has brilliantly analysed the implications of India's criticism of the US arms aid to Pakistan and New Delhi's stand on Afghanistan; initial as well as later. He notes "The major military aid programme for Pakistan proposed by the Reagan administration was accepted with little opposition by the Democratic controlled House of Representatives as well as the Republican controlled Senate and that its continued funding over the next few years has created very little controversy. Many Indians have found

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1. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publication), pp. 385, 386.
 2. N.D.Palmer, *The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence* (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 89.

this hard to understand in view of the unsuccessful outcome of the earlier US-Pak security relationship. The difficulty of those with doubts about the wisdom of the new US link with Pakistan, however, was that Indian policy seemed to offer no alternative option. India's strong objections to the modest Carter programme made it seem as though New Delhi had no sense of proportion about what might create a threat to its security, so its objections to the larger Reagan programme won few supporters. Moreover, India's later statements calling for the removal of foreign troops from Afghanistan (without naming the Soviet Union) never overcame the adverse impact of its initial statement at the United Nations, which was made just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And New Delhi's continued reluctance to acknowledge that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has created a serious security threat to the region has made it virtually impossible for any American to gain support for a policy that gives top priority in the subcontinent to India"¹.

Even though it sometimes appeared that India was not very non-partisan in reacting to the Afghan imbroglio, New

 1. William J. Barnds. 'The United States and South Asia: Policy & Process' in Stephen Cohen ed. The Security of South Asia (Sage Publication), pp. 158, 159.

Delhi's fears regarding US arms to Pakistan could not be dismissed as exaggerated. The security risk which India felt on account of Washington's arms aid to Islamabad was a real one. Even some Americans felt this way. In an Op-Ed piece in the New York Times of July 15, 1981, Selig S. Harrison wrote ".... it is becoming increasingly clear that the combined impact of the Administration's overtures to Islamabad and Peking, has produced the most dangerous crisis in relations between New Delhi and Washington since India won its independence in 1947". "America", advised Harrison, "should not exacerbate tensions and stimulate an arms race between India and Pakistan For America, it would be the ultimate folly to become embroiled in this struggle". Already, he warned, "Indian anxieties concerning the Soviet presence in Kabul are giving way to renewed preoccupation with the Chinese-Pakistan-American challenge"¹.

Mrs. Gandhi's meeting with President Reagan at the Cancun Summit in Oct. 1981 was a friendly one. This was followed by the arrival of a new US Ambassador to India: Harry Barnes. He brought intense activism to his assignment, he aimed at

1. Selig S. Harrison. "India and Reagan's Tilt toward Pakistan" Op-Ed, New York Times, July 15, 1981.

underscoring those areas on which India and United States could cooperate leading to the establishment of a lasting and meaningful bilateral relationship¹.

In the spring of 1982, Barnes proposed that President Reagan invite Mrs. Gandhi to the United States². This came as a welcome opportunity to her. Mrs. Gandhi wished to reduce Indo-US differences for a number of reasons. The first being the desire not to lose freedom of action by becoming a Soviet satellite. Although she criticised Morarji Desai's policy of genuine non-alignment, Mrs. Gandhi pursued a similar goal after settling back into office in 1980. She also wanted to reduce her country's dependence on Soviet arms, and have access to the better technology of the west³. Apart from this, the war in Afghanistan caused considerable worry to New Delhi. It provided Pakistan the justification Islamabad needed to acquire the latest US military equipment. The plight of Afghan Muslims stirred passions among Muslims in India. With most of the world firmly on record as condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, India perceived the risks of international isolation. Consequently Mrs. Gandhi gradually broadened her

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1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), pp. 386, 387.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 389.
 3. *Ibid.*, pp. 380, 381.

diplomatic base. She began to reach out to the United States¹. India had additional reasons in forging better ties with the US. Indian strategists must have reached the conclusion that the US-Pak tie could not be shaken unless India moved closer to Washington. There were some Indians who saw long-term benefits from a renewed American tie, especially in matters of technology transfer and in dealing with the Soviets when they showed signs of fading interest in Delhi².

When Washington approved Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the US, India brought about change in its attitude. Its rhetoric regarding US arms to Pakistan began to diminish. The Indians were gradually coming to terms with the fact that protests were not going to alter US policy toward Pakistan³. Mrs. Gandhi was interested in making the visit a successful one. This is borne out by her statements in the pre-departure interviews with the US newsmen. "My major aim is to try to convince people that you can have friendship even if you do

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1. H.W.Brands, India and The United States. The Cold Peace (Twayne Publishers: Boston, 1990), pp. 170-171.
 2. Stephen Philip Cohen. 'The Reagan Administration and India' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 146.
 3. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), p. 389.

not agree on all matters", she told the Washington Post¹. Talking with the New York Times, the PM stressed her desire to "correct" US misperceptions about India's relations with the Soviets. "We are friends with the Soviets and that does not prevent us from being friends with - trying to be friends with China or with the United States"². She told journalist Tad Szulc, "we didn't join the chorus of condemnation (on Afghanistan) but we do not approve of the Soviet presence there, and we have told them privately, as we have said it publicly"³.

In the USA Mrs. Gandhi presented herself as a soft-spoken leader of the Third-World, seeking to convince Americans that even if their two countries disagreed on issues like arms to Pakistan, they could still be friends. Only occasionally did she dissent with US when she compared the Soviet presence in Afghanistan to US involvement in El Salvador⁴. Mrs. Gandhi's friendly attitude toward the United States generated euphoria which exercised a positive influence on Indo-US bilateral

1. Washington Post, 23 July 1982.

2. New York Times, 23 July 1982.

3. Tad Szulc, "What Indira Gandhi Wants You to Know", Parade Magazine, Washington Post, 25 July 1982.

4. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), p. 391.

relations even as Washington continued good ties with Pakistan¹. The improvement in bilateral atmosphere led to renewal of talks about the sale of US arms to India focused on 155 mm howitzers and TOW anti-tank missiles². State Deptt. spokesman John Hughes said, "We want to help India meet its legitimate security needs and believe military sales would make a positive contribution"³. The issue of arms sales to India received support from Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah who encouraged the administration to approve any military equipment sale "India dares to request"⁴. Through such a policy Hatch hoped United States could gradually wean New Delhi away from Moscow by reducing India's dependence on Soviet weapons⁵. The arms sales, however did not materialize because anti-India lobby focused on security issues, and underscored the possibility of leakage of US supplied weapons to the Soviet Union⁶ "The basic American policy dilemma", therefore, as noted by Stephen Cohen, "in attempting to wean India from Soviet influence was that advocates of this policy

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1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 393.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 393.
 3. *India Abroad*, 27 May 1983.
 4. *New York Times*, 20 May 1983; *The Statesman*, 1 June 1983.
 5. Dennis Kux. *op. cit.*, p. 394.
 6. *Ibid.*, p. 394.

were not able to shake loose sufficient military equipment and advanced technology to make the United States a serious alternative to the Soviets. Indeed few realistically had such hopes, and there were many policy makers who were perfectly aware that their efforts would only help India drive a better bargain with the Soviets. That was not seen as harmful to American interests, per se, but there was lingering regret that India had lost considerable policy autonomy and had become chronically anti-American in various international forums and that the Soviets had obtained a foothold in India, that no Indian government could eliminate, which one day might adversely affect American strategic interests"¹.

The goodwill and the spirit that was generated during Mrs. Gandhi's 1982 US visit was maintained during George Shultz's July 1983 visit to India. Even though the administration sought improved relations with India, the keystone of its South Asia policy remained Pakistan, essential for continuing support for the guerrilla war in Afghanistan

 1. Stephen Philip Cohen. 'The Reagan Administration and India' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 147.

against the Soviets¹. There were complaints on both the sides. Indian annoyance about US arms shipments to Pakistan continued, US annoyance about India's unwillingness to condemn the Soviets over Afghanistan continued². Despite temporary setbacks the US administration continued to promote the high level dialogue sending Vice President George Bush to India in May 1984. Though George Bush exhibited optimism by admitting the absence of any major obstacle between Washington and New Delhi and admired Mrs. Gandhi's role in the NAM, India's obsession with arms transfer to Pakistan continued³. Mrs. Gandhi's charge of US support for dictatorships was answered by Bush's appeal to Pakistan to expedite its return to democracy⁴.

If in the 1950s Krishna Menon became the symbol of Indian antagonism to the United States, Mrs. Gandhi assumed this role during most of her years as Prime Minister. Despite denials by her aides about Mrs. Gandhi's dislike for the US, she made no bones about her bias against the United States. This negative attitude for the US partly developed during her student days

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1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 395.
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 396.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 397.
 4. *The Statesman*, 20 May 1984; *India Abroad* 19 May 1984.

in Britain in 1930s and was partly inherited from her father. However with the passage of time Indira earned grudging respect from the US leaders as a major world figure. The belated recognition in Washington that she was not a puppet of Moscow, but a nationalist pressing India's interests as she perceived them tended to place the issues in the right perspective to some extent¹.

Rajiv succeeded his mother as the Prime Minister of India. When Rajiv became the PM, Washington and New Delhi were still in the early stage of groping their way out of the impasse which had made their relations largely hostage to US ties with Islamabad and India's with the Soviet Union². In May 1985, Ambassador Barnes and Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari, who had replaced Rasgotra, signed the MOU implementation agreement³. US Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige hailed the accord and predicted a large increase in US computer sales and cooperative technology agreements with India⁴. Another significant event in the Indo-US bilateral relations was the visit to India of Under Secretary for Policy Dr. Fred Ikle.

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1. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), pp. 399, 400.
 2. Ibid., p. 401.
 3. Ibid., p. 401.
 4. New York Times, 17 May 1985, The Statesman, 18 May 1985.

His main purpose was to expand the scope of Indo-American security cooperation¹. During his visit the possibility of technical cooperation in the development of Light Combat Aircraft was explored. Ikle also discussed ways to speed up US processing of Indian applications for exports of defence-related equipment, at the same time stressing Washington's concerns that India's system of internal controls needed strengthening to prevent diversion of items to the Soviets². The progress on the LCA signalled that after a break of two decades Washington was cooperating with India's expanding defence industry³. Looking to the 21st century Ikle envisaged Indo-US security cooperation contributing to the world stability. "And that I think", Ikle said "is an exciting possibility and perhaps a new chapter in United States-Indian relations"⁴. The US approval for sale of GE-404 engine to be used in the LCA was a sign of more forthcoming security cooperation with India⁵. However, the test of US seriousness

1. Interview with Dr. Fred Ikle, June 6, 1991 cited in Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 402.

2. Ibid.

3. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p.402.

4. *Washington Post*, May 4, 1985; *New York Times*, May 2 & 4, 1985.

5. *The Statesman*, Sept. 26, 1985.

came in its willingness to provide Cray XMP-24 supercomputer to India. This project encountered opposition in the US on grounds of possible leakage of technology to the Soviets and possible use of Cray XMP-24 for nuclear weapons and missile development. Therefore, compromise solution was found in the supply of Cray XMP-14 instead of Cray XMP-24¹. This disappointed the Indians. Natwar Singh appropriately stated during April 1987 visit to Washington that US-Indian relations were like the titles of two novels of Charles Dickens - Great Expectations and Hard Times².

Another major setback against the background of improved bilateral relations during Rajiv Gandhi's regime centered around the announcement by Casper Weinberger of possible AWACS sale to Pakistan³. New Delhi vehemently opposed such a move pointing out that AWACS would be of limited use against the Soviets but instead would be directed against India⁴. Visiting Indian Foreign Secretary A.P. Venkateshwaran warned Washington in Jan. 1987 that providing the AWACS would trigger a "very destabilising arms race in South Asia, requiring heavy Indian

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1. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), pp. 404, 407, 410.
 2. *The Statesman*, April 23, 1987.
 3. Dennis Kux, *op. cit.*, pp. 408, 409.
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 409.

expenditures to match Pakistan's new capability"¹. Opposition to the proposed AWACS sale to Pakistan came from within the US also. John Glenn of Ohio and others urged the Reagan administration to go slow on AWACS. Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire urged that if AWACS were provided to Pakistan this should be balanced in some way acceptable to India². The AWACS and the Cray episode dampened New Delhi's hopes regarding the prospects of enhanced relations. Under pressure from party MPs Rajiv Gandhi expressed Indian resentment by cancelling External Affairs Minister N.D. Tiwari's visit to the United States³.

Rajiv's second visit to US in 1987 was brief and low key than the 1985 visit. President Reagan and Rajiv Gandhi agreed to expand defence cooperation, proceeding along the lines they had already established in working together on aspects of the Light Combat Aircraft and in other areas⁴. Turning to Indo-US defence cooperation the PM stated "we have seen progress on that confidence-building exercise. We have completed everything we had targeted to do. Now we have got to start a

1. India Abroad, January 16, 1987.

2. The Statesman, February 23, 1987.

3. India Abroad, May 15, 1987.

4. White House statement on "New Initiatives in Indo-US Relations", October 20, 1987

new phase". Overall, Rajiv declared, "We had ups and downs and our differences. But these two years have seen a very substantial improvement in our relations"¹. Frank Carlucci the new US Secretary of Defence who succeeded Weinberger visited India and Pakistan in April 1988². In India Frank Carlucci announced further cooperation in developing LCA and permitted use in the same of a highly advanced gyroscope³. Frank Carlucci's visit signified the continuance of the expanded high level dialogue, especially in the security area.

An important backdrop to the improving Indo-US bilateral relations was the parallel improvement in US-Soviet relations and confrontation taking a backseat in the bilateral agenda as Gorbachov's policy of perestroika unfolded⁴. There were clear signals that Moscow wished to pull out of Kabul. Rajiv Gandni also conveyed to the Soviets his feelings that India wanted Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, and occasionally served as an unofficial channel between the United States and the Soviet Union⁵.

1. The Hindu, October 23, 1987.

2. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), p.416.

3. New York Times, Washington Post, April 7, 1988.

4. Dennis Kux, op. cit., p. 416.

5. Ibid., p. 416.

By 1990 after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and with the diminishing importance of Pakistan as a frontline state in the United States strategic design, Washington's axe fell against Islamabad. The US President refused to certify the non-nuclear status of Pakistan and suspended military-cum-economic assistance in line with the requirements of the Pressler amendment. This action of George Bush caused much satisfaction in India, unhappy as it was on account of United States reluctance to arrest Pakistan's progress in the direction of acquisition and upgradation of nuclear capability¹.

An analysis of Indo-US relations against the backdrop of Afghanistan crisis makes an interesting study. As Stephen Cohen observes "The 1981-87 period was one in which significant Indian interests were accommodated by the United States, even as Washington became the major supplier of arms to one of Delhi's chief military threats, Islamabad"². A popular metaphor of American-Indian relations is that it has

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1. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 426.
 2. Stephen Philip Cohen. 'The Reagan Administration and India' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. *The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush* (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 150.

been a series of ups and downs over the years. This is a worn out cliché. The real variable has been the dramatic engagement, and disengagement of United States in South Asia over the years. The 1940s and 1950s saw a period of engagement, after 1965 a long spell of disengagement occurred and there was a revived American regional role between 1980 and 1991. During each period of American regional involvement some important Indian and Pakistani interests have been advanced and a few were damaged¹.

India and Pakistan both have had their periods of disillusionment with the United States because of shifting American policy. Washington has often tended to follow a reactive foreign policy and this inconsistency in its policy has served to erode its credibility. However, both India and Pakistan are real entities for Washington and US response to any South Asian issue whether Afghanistan or any other will have the potential of serving America's long term interest only when it genuinely reconciles the contending claims of both New Delhi and Islamabad. Any US policy deliberately

 1. Stephen Philip Cohen. 'The Reagan Administration and India' in Sumit Ganguly and Harold A. Gould eds. *The Hope and The Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Bush* (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 150.

overlooking this fact and loaded in favour of either country, will not only have the effect of undermining US credibility but also cause setback to the resolution of the regional problems.

CHAPTER V

THE BILATERAL DISCORD OVER NON- PROLIFERATION AND TECHNOLOGY DENIAL - THE PAST AND THE POST-COLD WAR SCENARIO

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THE BILATERAL DISCORD OVER NON-PROLIFERATION AND TECHNOLOGY DENIAL - THE PAST AND THE POST COLD WAR SCENARIO

The United States and India, both, are committed to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Yet the United States approach to non-proliferation which advocates that universal membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the world's best hope for progress toward this goal, has been challenged by India from the very beginning. India has refused to adhere to the NPT on the ground that it is a discriminatory treaty and it has alleged that the United States, by its nuclear policies and their political fallout, specifically by the failure of the US to live upto the 1963 agreement to supply enriched uranium for the American built nuclear power plant at Tarapur, has interfered with India's programme for the peaceful development of atomic energy¹. The United States was critical of India's explosion of a peaceful nuclear device in 1974, for it feared that this would mark the beginning of an era of nuclear proliferation, and it tried, without success, to persuade India to adhere to the NPT and accept

1. N.D.Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 211.

full-scope safeguards for all its nuclear facilities¹.

Despite consistent pressure from the West and erstwhile Soviet Union to sign the NPT, India has steadfastly refused to do so. Through the late 1970s and the 1980s the New Delhi government pressed the view that India could not consider signing until the major powers demonstrated their own commitment to disarmament². It has refused to obey the rules of the club organised by the haves which tried to impose rules on the have-nots³. India challenged the political and technological hierarchy of the international system which was dominated by nuclear-weapons states. New Delhi vigorously opposed the production and deployment of nuclear weapons, it did not subscribe to the theory of international security through mutual assured destruction. At the same time India slowly but systematically expanded its own programme of nuclear research and the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes⁴. With the graduation of China to the status of a nuclear weapons state in the 1980s and the probability of

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1. N.D.Palmer, *The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence* (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 211.
 2. Robert W. Bradnock. *India's Foreign Policy Since 1971*. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp. 89-90.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Surjit Mansingh. *India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982* (Sage Publications), p. 97.

a nuclear weapons capability surfacing in Pakistan in the 1980s, India's security needs coincided with its principles, India asserted its sovereign right to keep the options open for the future direction of its nuclear and space programmes¹.

Apart from India's perception of NPT being a discriminatory and unequal treaty, New Delhi has other reasons for rejecting this treaty. Among these is Pakistan - India's major security threat - which has not accepted the NPT. Moreover India feels, that signing the NPT would undermine its effort of emerging as a self-reliant nation in the nuclear field capable of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes through indigenously developed technology². This position was clearly stated by India's ambassador to the United Nations shortly after the NPT was ready for signatures in 1968: "since nuclear technology is the technology of the future and is likely to become a crucial and potent instrument of economic development and social progress, it would obviously be invidious for the greater part of the world to become wholly dependent on a few nuclear weapon states for the knowledge and

1. Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982 (Sage Publications), p. 97.

2. N.D. Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 215.

application of this technology and when it is proposed that this should be done for an initial period of 25 years regardless of the technological breakthrough during this period, would this not widen the economic and technical gap that already exists and which developing countries are striving to close"¹.

India believes that the threat to the world arises not from the non-nuclear weapon powers but from the nuclear weapon states which preach the necessity of abjuring nuclear weapons without abandoning their own nuclear arsenal. Many Americans share the same apprehensions and suspicions. As Robert Goheen observed, "the only nuclear weapons proliferation ... that has in fact occurred over the past three decades has been in the arsenals of the superpowers ... Until the superpowers can achieve substantial self-denial with respect to nuclear weapons, American efforts to dissuade other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities or from at least reserving the option for themselves - will be less than fully convincing"². This is a point of view to which India strongly adheres. As long as it is convinced that the NPT is an unequal

1. Indian Express, July 16, 1968.

2. Robert F. Goheen, "Problems of Proliferation: US Policy and the Third World", World Politics 35 (Jan. 1983), p. 194.

and discriminatory agreement and as long as the big powers take no effective and meaningful steps to reduce their nuclear stockpile, India is unlikely to associate itself formally with the NPT. This was probably the reason why India refrained from supporting the indefinite extension of the NPT and signing the same when this agreement was taken up for renewal in 1995. Apart from this India is not likely to alter its position that it will not agree formally to full scope safeguards over all its nuclear facilities including those built essentially by itself, although it will abide by safeguards that it was compelled to accept as the price for nuclear assistance from erstwhile Soviet Union, Canada, as well as from the United States, for specific materials and facilities, and it will continue to enforce its own system of safeguards¹.

India's posture, however, was not simply negative. At UN fora and particularly at the standing Geneva Conference on Disarmament, India's leaders provided an alternative vision of a global approach toward nuclear disarmament, based on universal and non-discriminatory principles. Foremost amongst the ideas supported by India were proposals for a

1. N.D.Palmer, *The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence* (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 220.

comprehensive test ban and global cutoff in fissile materials production, two initiatives that were top priorities in Geneva at the time the NPT first came into force. Subsequently they became a centrepiece of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament introduced at the Special UN Session on Disarmament in 1988¹. Not only this India and Pakistan supported two US sponsored resolutions in the United Nations introduced in Sept. 1993 proposing a ban on the production of fissile materials and negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty². This aspect of Indo-US cooperation was appreciated by Prime Minister Rao in his address to the American Congress during his visit to the United States in May 1994³. However, India's accession to any agreement banning fissile material production would have several implications. It would require its militarily-relevant nuclear facilities like Cirus/Dhruva research reactors and its plutonium reprocessing plants to come under a verifiable, perhaps intrusive, inspections, and safeguards regime⁴. Since

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1. Preface to 'Bridging The Non-Proliferation Divide: The United States and India', Edited by Francine R. Frankel.
 2. P.R.Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand off: The Role of the United States (Manohar, 1995), p. 175.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid., p. 176.

power reactors, too, could be worked at reduced irradiation levels to produce weapons usable plutonium, the entire Indian nuclear programme may need to be placed under this system of inspections and safeguards on technological considerations¹. A system of credible inspections however would be essential to convey reassurance that fissile materials are not being diverted for military purposes, and that nuclear facilities are not used in the first place for producing weapons-usable fissile materials. The emotive argument could, therefore be raised that this proposal only succeeds in disarming the unarmed².

Further a mechanism would need to be evolved to permit initial stocks of weapons-grade materials to be credibly accounted for lest a situation obtains that future stocks are under control but past stocks remain unknown. The further purpose of a reduction of the weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) manufacturing programme would require apart from the declaration of all weapons - grade fissile stocks, any nuclear cores if they have been manufactured, and their physical verification. For this purpose, all past working records of

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1. P.R.Chari, "Fresh Old Thinking", The Economic Times (New Delhi), Dec. 16, 1993.
 2. P.R.Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand off: The Role of the United States (Manohar), 1995, p. 176.

India's reactor and plutonium separation plant and its uranium enrichment facility at Ratnahalli would need to be made available by India. However, these measures militate strongly against India's basic positions on nuclear issues, especially India's long-held policy of emphasizing the need to achieve nuclear disarmament objectives by measures that are clearly universal and non-discriminatory¹.

These dilemmas become more accentuated with India's joining the US resolution seeking a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The implications of entering this Treaty would be that India would be prohibited from conducting underground nuclear tests. By entering a CTBT the rationale for the Agni programme that requires extensive testing with a nuclear warhead to establish a meaningful deterrent pattern against China would become questionable².

Three months after Watergate drove Richard Nixon from office, India conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokharan on May 18th, 1974³. The act caught the US government by surprise. The state Deptt's initial reaction was to

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1. P.R.Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand off: The Role of the United States (Manohar, 1995), p. 178.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), p. 314.

criticize the Indian test as a damaging breach in the non-proliferation wall. But later Henry Kissinger diluted the criticism and made the official reaction milder. Since the Indian explosion was a fait accompli, Kissinger believed public condemnation would not undo the event, but would deprive the US of the leverage Washington might have on India's future nuclear policy¹. When Ambassador Moynihan met Mrs. Gandhi to present the official reaction to the test, he added some personal thoughts "India has made a huge mistake. Here you were the No.1 hegemonic power in South Asia. Nobody was No.2 and call Pakistan No.3. Now in a decade's time, some Pakistani general will call you up and say I have four nuclear weapons and I want Kashmir. If not, we will drop them on you and we will all meet in heaven. And then what will you do"².

The US nuclear non-proliferation lobby regarded the reaction of the administration as weak and inadequate. If India one of the world's poorest countries could explode a nuclear device and get away with it, the anti-nuclear lobby feared it would only be a matter of time before others followed suit. The lobby wanted the United States, like

1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 315.

2. Ibid.

Canada, to punish India by ending nuclear cooperation¹.

The non-proliferation supporters found an ally in a longtime critic of India Clarence Long, a Maryland Democrat, and chairman of the foreign aid appropriations subcommittee. Shortly after the test, Long won acceptance for a bill directing the US government to vote against all loans to India in the World Bank. The action had no practical effect since the United States lacked a majority in the Bank. It was, however, a symbolic slap, that made clear the force of the congressional annoyance about the nuclear test². Apart from non-proliferation concerns, many in Congress, and elsewhere criticized India's diversion of scarce resources from economic development to nuclear programme. Mrs. Gandhi answered by emphasizing India's need for technical development in the shape of nuclear programme and suggested that critics were trying to keep India down³.

The issue which particularly offended the anti-nuclear lobby was Indian insistence that the explosion was in pursuit of a peaceful programme and was not a weapons oriented one. Critics were dissatisfied with such an explanation because the

1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 316.

2. New York Times, 8 June 1974.

3. Ibid., 26 May, 3 June 1974.

specialists found it impossible to differentiate between military and peaceful explosions¹.

The Indo-US bilateral differences were accentuated on account of India's unexpected explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974. After 1974 the vexing issue of continuance of the US supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant became a major complicating factor in Indo-American relations. This issue became even more of a complication after the US Congress passed The Nuclear Non-proliferation Act 1978². When Washington, through this domestic legislation, requiring full scope safeguards, sought to put pressure on India, the bilateral relations turned tense³. Washington's immediate leverage stemmed from New Delhi's dependence on US Supplies of enriched uranium for the Tarapur power plant, which was built by the United States under a 1963 agreement with India that also stipulated uninterrupted US supplies of enriched uranium for thirty years to fuel it. Under its new legislation, Washington sought to link fuel supplies with full scope

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1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 316.
 2. N.D.Palmer. *The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence* (New York, Praeger), p. 213.
 3. S.P.Seth. 'The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet And The United States'. *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVIII, No.7, July 1988, p. 723.

safeguards for all of India's nuclear installations. When India refused, fuel for the Tarapur plant was delayed and disrupted¹. India perceived the NNPA, 1978 as a municipal legislation, which could not in equity act retrospectively to render the Indo-US Agreement on Tarapur nugatory which had the status of an international treaty². India also felt that if the Agreement had become inoperative, the issue of utilising the accumulated reactor plutonium needed resolution³.

In the meantime another jolt to the Indo-US bilateral relations had surfaced. In April 1978 the US journal Outside reported that in 1965 the CIA and Indian intelligence agents had installed a nuclear-powered monitoring device on the Nanda Devi peak to gather data on Chinese missile developments without the knowledge of the Indian government⁴. The device was lost and could possibly endanger the environment. The Times of India and the leftist circles began a phobic campaign against the US. The Prime Minister summoned Ambassador Goheen

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1. S.P.Seth. 'The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet And The United States'. Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No.7, July 1988, p. 723.
 2. P.R.Chari, "An Indian Reaction to US Non-Proliferation Policy", International Security, Fall 1978, Vol.3, N.2, pp. 57-6.
 3. P.R.Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff: The Role of The United States (Manohar 1995), pp. 57-58.
 4. Paul F. Power. "The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy". Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No.6, June 1979, p. 587.

to explain the affair. Subsequently Morarji Desai explained that the device had been lost during the installation because of a blizzard. Another device was installed and later removed. He clarified that there was little likelihood of environmental damage. Three Indian govts. had been involved in the project. This episode demonstrated the fragility of Indo-American relations¹. After the Prime Minister's statement the anti-American tirade vanished but lingering suspicions of CIA machinations in India and fears of the possible contamination of environment remained².

Pakistan's nuclear programme and Washington's response to it has always been a major bone of contention in Indo-US bilateral relations. During 1985 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in an interview with Newsweek identified Pakistan's nuclear programme as India's major problem with the US which was "not doing all it could to stop them"³. Rajiv Gandhi was not persuaded that US arms aid to Pakistan was discouraging it from developing a bomb, he maintained that, in effect, Islamabad was having it both ways. New Delhi believed that the

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1. Paul F. Power. "The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy". Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No.6, June 1979, p. 587.
 2. Inder Malhotra, "Nuclear Pack at Nanda Devi: Some Unanswered Question", The Times of India, April 20, 1978.
 3. Quoted in The Times of India, May 26, 1985.

US was in a position to restrain Pakistan, but was unwilling because of Islamabad's strategic utility¹. When interviewed by Forbes magazine, Rajiv Gandhi said the US "perceptions of Pakistan's strategic usefulness seem to prevail over a larger concern for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons"². To this perceived US-Pak nexus was added the China factor. When the India-China border dispute erupted in 1987, New Delhi was buzzing with reports of this trilateral nexus against India. From here, it was only an short step to believing that there was "a pattern of destabilization in which external forces hostile to India (Pakistan-US-China) had been revealed to be inextricably linked with the internal forces of political and economic subversion"³ as spelled out in the Congress Party's resolution adopted in April 1987. India's concern over nuclear collaboration between Pakistan and China tends to become alarmist with India's perception of America's acquiescence in this⁴. Indo-US relations have a history of misperceptions and misunderstandings going back to the 1950s, when Pakistan was inducted into the US-led western alliance. And during the

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1. S.P.Seth. 'The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet and The United States Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No.7, July 1988, p.726.
 2. Quoted in Times of India, May 10, 1987.
 3. The Times of India, April 19, 1987.
 4. S.P.Seth. op. cit., p. 722.

Nixon presidency when China suddenly became important in the US scheme of things, India's downgrading was too unsubtle for New Delhi's comfort¹.

India has always rejected a non-proliferation regime that creates power parity with Pakistan on the basis of its much smaller nuclear programme. This is because India feels that it could give Pakistan a veto over India's substantial atomic energy development programme, as well as provide access to India's technological secrets². In this connection India has always resented US attempts to create power parity between the subcontinent's two unequal nations. India also rejects US premise that New Delhi is somehow responsible for forcing Pakistan onto its present nuclear course³.

In the midst of confusion and uncertainty in US-Pakistani relations PM Rajiv Gandhi visited United States in Oct. 1987. Rajiv Gandhi detected a shift in the US position on Pakistan's nuclear ambitions and was assured by President Reagan that the United States would take action against Pakistan if it went ahead with its nuclear weapons programme⁴. However

1. S.P.Seth. 'The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet and The United States Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No.7, July 1988, pp. 722-23.

2. Ibid., p. 721.

3. Ibid., p. 725.

4. Ibid., p. 725.

President Reagan continued to stand by the usual US position and it soon became evident that Rajiv Gandhi's optimism was misplaced when the US President said "I urged that India and Pakistan intensify their dialogue to build greater mutual confidence to resolve outstanding issues and to deal with the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region"¹. The nuclear question, therefore, remains a major problem in US-Indian relations. And when New Delhi is paired with Pakistan this resentment becomes even greater, leading to the belief that Washington is not serious about preventing Pakistan from going nuclear². This prompted Prof. Frankel to stress the need to disengage the Indo-US relationship from its Pakistani shadow. As Prof. Frankel has stated, Washington needs to formulate an "India" policy that "must involve treating India as a separate case in bilateral relations ... on the basis of India's increasing economic, military, political and strategic importance to the power balance in the crucial Indian Ocean area"³.

The issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, long of substantial concern to Washington, acquired greater US policy

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1. The Times of India, Oct. 22, 1987.
 2. S.P.Seth. 'The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duct and The United States Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No.7, July 1988, p.726.
 3. Francine R. Frankel, Series of articles in The Times of India, May 16-24, 1985.

salience in the post-Gulf war environment. In this respect, South Asia could be compared with the Middle East and North Korea as an object of Washington's anxiety. In June 1991 the Bush administration lent its support to a Pakistani proposal for a five power - United States, Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan conference to discuss a nuclear free zone in South Asia. India resisted the proposal then, as it did again in November when Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew visited Delhi and Islamabad. But both India and Pakistan agreed to further talks in Washington early in 1992. India's slightly greater flexibility might have been prompted by the shock of a Soviet vote in the UN earlier in November supporting the nuclear-free zone proposal¹. The present goal of American non-proliferation policy towards South Asia is to "cap, then overtime, reduce and finally eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery"² in India and Pakistan. Specifically it is pressing them to join a CTBT and an international agreement banning the manufacture of fissile

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1. Alan D. Romberg & Marshall M. Bonton. 'The US and Asia in 1991', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No.1, Jan. 1992, pp. 9-10.
 2. USIS Official Text, Progress toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia, p. 3.

materials for military purposes. While presenting his credentials to the Indian President, newly appointed US ambassador, Frank G. Wisner, declared: "Two of my priorities are working with India to bring to fruition the proposals for a verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and a comprehensive test ban treaty"¹. However, American credentials to credibly pursue this non-proliferation policy in South Asia is suspect. For all practical purposes, United States has acquiesced in Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear capabilities during Reagan/Bush administration². It is now being urged that the US policy "appears to have recognized that the real nuclear issue in South Asia is no longer the attainment of capabilities, but the risks of confrontation, nuclear use and an arms race. However, the United States has been unable to separate these legitimate concerns from the anachronistic campaign to stop the initial acquisition of nuclear capabilities"³. These

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1. USIS Official Text, US Ambassador Frank G. Wisner presents credentials, August 2, 1994.
 2. P.R. Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff. The Role of The United States. (Manohar, 1995), p. 209.
 3. John Hawes, 'Nuclear Proliferation: Down to the Hard Cases'; Programme on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park, PRAC Paper No.6, June 1993, p. 10.

arguments echo sentiments obtaining in India and Pakistan that their respective nuclear programmes are now in the "post-proliferation" stage¹ and that it would be more profitable, consequently, to expend diplomatic/military efforts to make the subcontinent "nuclear safe" because it can no longer be "nuclear free", and that it would enhance South Asian security and stability if greater "nuclear transparency" was brought about².

Nuclear pacificism has not commended itself to any of the major political parties in India. Their general declaration on this question have stressed the necessity that the nuclear option should not be surrendered and the costs of retaining the option are irrelevant where national security is concerned. The broad direction of India's nuclear policy pursued by successive governments has been framed within this broad policy framework³. Current US strategy to cap the Indian nuclear programme has narrowed down to pressing it to join a CTBT and an agreement to ban the manufacture of fissile

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1. Maroot Raza, "The Advantages of Having the Bomb", Financial Exp. (New Delhi), Oct. 14, 1994.
 2. Mushahid Hussain, "Let us have N-bombs", The Pioneer New Delhi), June 8, 1994, and General K. Sundarji, "Is Pakistan's nuclear deterrent losing credibility?", Indian Express (New Delhi), Sept. 15, 1994.
 3. P.R.Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand Off. The Role of The United States (Manohar, 1995), p. 24.

material for military purposes. This would ensure that the Indo-Pak nuclear standoff is truncated at its present state of nuclear capability, but more importantly, the weaponization option becomes unavailable to them¹. However, a structural impasse obtains in South Asian security which will need to be resolved if non-proliferation is to be sustained². That impasse derives from Pakistan's felt need for nuclear capabilities to deter India's larger conventional forces and India's perceived requirement for capabilities to deter a nuclear China³. The fear of nuclear asymmetry has been the strongest motive for developing nuclear weapons. Stalin feared the US nuclear monopoly, and Chinese leaders feared Soviet bombs. India found nuclear asymmetry with China intolerable, tested one nuclear device Pakistan responded to the Indian nuclear threat, and is thought to have weapons that are ready, if untested. The primacy of China in this triangular nuclear interaction is emphasized and underlines the direction in which American non-proliferation diplomacy must be

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1. P.R.Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand Off. The Role of The United States (Manohar, 1995), p. 222.
 2. John Simpson and Daryll Howlett, "The NPT Renewal Conference Stumbling Toward 1995", International Security, Vol. 19, No.1 (Summer 1994), p. 52.
 3. P.R.Chari. op. cit., p. 223.

channelised¹. However, the current American efforts to accord a new centrality to nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine questions its commitment to the non-proliferation objective. The US nuclear doctrine is shifting from earlier nostrums that nuclear wars must never be fought, since they can never be won, and earlier theses that nuclear weapons only serve the ends of deterrence to contemplating their actual utilisation for achieving defined operational objectives². The US credibility regarding its non-proliferation professions has become further suspect with the adoption of Brown Amendment to enable United States to clear the transfer of long-held arms consignment to Pakistan for which payment had been made long back. Kalyani Shankar points out "An interesting aspect of the whole issue is that no one can be sure whether the amendment is a one time waiver. No one from the United States has authoritatively declared that the Brown Amendment is a one-time waiver and that arms sales to Pakistan will not be resumed"³.

The million dollar question after the indefinite

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1. P.R.Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand Off. The Role of The United States (Manohar, 1995), p. 223.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Kalyani Shankar. 'Pitted against a President'. The Hindustan Times, Nov. 5, 1995.

extension of the NPT is what should be the stand of India on the non-proliferation issue. K. Subrahmanyam believes that the nuclear policy review conducted by the US, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT and the submissions of the US delegation before the world court on the legality of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons all highlight the fact that President Bill Clinton has reneged on his commitment made in the Rao-Clinton communique of May 19, 1994 that the US would work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons¹. Subrahmanyam further observes that the indefinite and unconditional extension of NPT in particular constitutes the perpetual legitimisation of nuclear weapons². Since the international community has legitimised nuclear weapons it is legitimate for countries which are not signatories to the Treaty to have nuclear weapons³. Even while continuing to wage the relentless struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, India has to project an image of having a deterrent capability in a non-provocative manner⁴. India

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1. K.Subrahmanyam. 'India's Nuclear Policy: Official Inertia Weakens Position, The Times of India, Nov. 24, 1995.
 2. Ibid.
 3. K. Subrahmanyam. 'Indefinite NPT Extension. India Must Formulate Response'. The Times of India, June 7, 1995.
 4. K.Subrahmanyam. 'India's Nuclear Policy: Official Inertia Weakens Position', The Times of India, Nov. 24, 1995.

should therefore proclaim as had been done by Dr. Raja Ramanna (the then minister of state for defence) in May 1990 that it would never use its nuclear capability first but will rise to the occasion if it is attacked with nuclear weapons¹.

India may have advocated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at some point of time but in the face of recent numerous developments in the nuclear field which merely reveal the hegemonic designs of the nuclear-weapon powers, particularly the US, and serve to strengthen the Third World suspicion regarding the West's ambition to retain nuclear monopoly, it becomes imperative for India to judge the issues afresh. India should make it clear that it will not sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty unless all test facilities of nuclear weapon powers are shut down and there is an international verification regime to ensure that there will be no sophisticated testing². India should reserve the right to continue research on similar hydronuclear and other testing if the proposed comprehensive test ban treaty does not cover such tests³. The message should also be conveyed to the world that any fissile materials production cut-off will not be

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1. K.Subrahmanyam. 'India's Nuclear Policy: Official Inertia Weakens Position', The Times of India, Nov. 24, 1995.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

acceptable to India unless the nuclear weapon powers' fissile material transactions are brought under safeguards. Otherwise countries like Pakistan can obtain its fissile materials from the surpluses of nuclear weapon powers¹. New Delhi should be strong enough not to succumb to Washington's pressure to fall in line with the US parameters of global security. Such pressure has come in one form or the other from time to time, the latest one being the floating of the idea by the US that India was going ahead with its plans to undertake a second nuclear test. The New York Times on Dec. 15, 1995 reported that "American intelligence experts suspect that India is preparing for its first nuclear test since 1974"². Such report prompted Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, external affairs minister to dismiss the this news as baseless and speculative. Mr. Mukherjee also emphasized that though India had capabilities it had desisted from the manufacture of nuclear weapons in view of its policy to adhere to the nuclear programme for peaceful purposes only³.

Since the late 198s the question of missile proliferation has emerged as a major bone of contention between India and

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1. K.Subrahmanyam. 'India's Nuclear Policy: Official Inertia Weakens Position', The Times of India, Nov. 24, 1995.
 2. The Times of India, Dec. 22, 1995.
 3. The Times of India, Dec. 20, 1995.

United States. After the Gulf war, American concerns over the spread of missiles have been intensified leading to a more activist policy to prevent missile proliferation. This has coincided with the maturing of India's own missile development programme, thus creating the basis for Indo-US confrontation on another area of proliferation¹. The issue which is foremost in the mind of policy makers in Washington presently is the prevention of technology transfers which aid proliferation efforts. The United States is working toward strengthening the non-proliferation related export control mechanisms such as the Nuclear suppliers group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group that regulate the export of sensitive chemical materials and technologies². Export controls on nuclear, missile as well as dual-use technologies is primary in the non-proliferation programme of the United States. The abrogation of the Indo-Russian contract for the supply of Russian cryogenic engines and associated technology by Moscow to New Delhi and limiting it to the sale of rocket engines on account of the US pressure is an example of

1. C.Raja Mohan. 'Indo-US Cooperation in Arms Control' in Francine R. Frankel ed. 'Bridging the Non-Proliferation Divide. The United States and India' (Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd.), p. 376.

2. Ibid., p. 377.

technology denial because of Washington's fear of the possible misuse of rocket technology by New Delhi for acquiring intercontinental ballistic missile capability. The grounds urged by the United States were that supply of cryogenic engine technology would infract the MTCR guidelines¹. The MTCR prohibits technology transfers that might contribute to nuclear weapons delivery systems².

India had sought cryogenic engines from Russia for peaceful space applications. The Geo-stationary launch vehicle (GSLV) programme which is to follow PSLV programme is designed to utilise cryogenic engines to place a 2500 kg payload into a projected 36,000 km high orbit³. The embargo with regard to transfer of cryogenic engine technology which could assist launch of the geo-stationary satellite was the result of Washington's suspicion regarding the potential of the rocket engine for being used to acquire ICBM capabilities⁴ by India. India's assertion that the cryogenic engines were required for peaceful space programmes failed to allay the fears of United States⁵.

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1. P.R.Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand Off. The Role of United States (Manohar, 1995), p. 64
 2. Ibid., p. 68.
 3. Ibid., p. 42.
 4. Ibid., p. 69.
 5. Ibid., p. 69.

The United States has demanded that India refrain from the deployment of short-range Prithvi missile and forgo the development of medium-range Agni missile¹. Washington feels that the deployment of Prithvi has implications for regional security in that it could lead to a missile race in Pakistan². A three way arms race could develop by China being drawn in the confrontation should Agni be deployed at some later stage³. The intermediate range capabilities of Agni are perceived by Washington to be threat to larger American strategic interests in the Indian Ocean⁴. Some part of American anxieties about Agni also derives from its being seen as leading on to ICBM capabilities in tandem with GSLV/PSLV programmes⁵. The further dimension to the US concerns is that India's missiles and their technology could be transferred to other countries which would severely erode the MTCR regime⁶. However, India's own policy in relation to the export of

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1. C.Raja Mohan, 'Indo-US Cooperation in Arms Control' in Francine R. Frankel ed. 'Bridging the Nn-Proliferation Divide. The United States and India' (Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd.), p. 362.
 2. P.R.Chari. Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand Off. The Role of United States (Manohar, 1995), p. 69.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid., p. 142.
 6. Ibid., p. 42.

sensitive technologies has been a cautious one, and far more responsible than that demonstrated by some western countries¹. Pragmatic thinking in some quarters in India appears to be inclined to participate in the export control mechanisms as a way of addressing American concerns on the spread of mass destruction weapons². It has been suggested that India could join these arrangements as an equal partner, abiding by the rules and gaining better access to American technology. But the difficulty is that Washington treats New Delhi as a target of export controls rather than as a partner.³

The US policy of throttling India's technological development in the missile and space arena is unwarranted in view of New Delhi's opinion that missiles have already been widely diffused all over Asia and that India is one of the late entrants into the missile game⁴. In order to remove the US suspicions on the missile proliferation question, India can explain to the United States that it has no intention of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile. This effort

1. C.Raja Mohan. 'Indo-US Cooperation in Arms Control' in Francine R. Frankel ed. 'Bridging the Non-Proliferation Divide. The United States and India' (Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd.), p. 378.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 376.

can be supplemented by the deployment of Prithvi missiles in a manner that is non-provocative to Pakistan¹. While the United States cannot be expected to support missile development in India, the two sides must find a way to ensure that the Indian civilian space programme is kept separate from the development of missiles and is not subject to sanctions². The track record of the US does not prove that it has acted in a non-partisan manner on the question of technology denial related to the missile proliferation issue. As K. Subrahmanyam puts it "The US does not appear to have objected to Israel developing the Jericho missile and its impact on the West Asian region. Nor is it known to have urged Saudi Arabia to give up its CSS-2 missile which can reach India and could also be transferred to Pakistan. The US permitted the transfer of the US aircraft from Jordan to Pakistan during the 1971 war"³.

The salient features of India's nuclear policy have been a strong commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the development of a broad-based indigenous nuclear power

1. C.Raja Mohan. 'Indo-US Cooperation in Arms Control' in Francine R. Frankel ed. 'Bridging the Non-Proliferation Divide. The United States and India' (Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd.), pp. 376, 337.

2. Ibid., p. 377.

3. K.Subrahmanyam. "Missile Proliferation, US Must Heed India's Concerns". Times of India, July 13, 1995.

programme, rejection of the military use of the nuclear energy, active support to the international liberal pacifist critique of nuclear weapons and the emphasis on non-discrimination in the construction of non-proliferation regimes¹. India's emphasis on adherence to moral principles, such as non-discriminatory and global approach in the resolution of nuclear weapons question, its refusal to abandon all or none choices in relation to the non-proliferation issue stands in contrast to the US approach based on realism with its emphasis on regional arms control approach while not disapproving bargaining in nuclear negotiations², PM Rao's address to the joint session of both Houses of the US Congress during his visit to Washington in May 1994 was replete with platitudes about the nuclear question. In his speech PM Rao reiterated India's traditional positions in favour of the global approach to non-proliferation and arms control, delegitimization of nuclear weapons, a nuclear no-first use agreement and serious multilateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament with the objective of a nuclear free world³.

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1. C.Raja Mohan. 'Indo-US Cooperation in Arms Control' in Francine R. Frankel ed. 'Bridging the Non-Proliferation Divide. The United States and India' (Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd.), p. 358.
 2. Ibid., p. 357.
 3. Ibid., p. 367.

A major obstacle to the Indo-US cooperation on arms control is the narrow focus of the Clinton administration's non-proliferation approach to India. India resents the US attitude to equate New Delhi with Islamabad on the nuclear question. The US objectives are limited to capping, rolling back and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons and missiles from both India and Pakistan. Washington fails to realize the value of an independent bilateral arms cooperation. The American arms control community sees India as part of the non-proliferation problem and is insensitive to New Delhi's security concerns¹. Unless both the democracies decide to examine the nuclear issue in a new and broader perspective, the disagreement over non-proliferation will accentuate and South Asian nuclear scenario will continue to evade a solution as we approach the 21st century.

 1. C.Raja Mohan. 'Indo-US Cooperation in Arms Control' in Francine R. Frankel ed. 'Bridging the Non-Proliferation Divide. The United States and India' (Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd.), pp. 378-79.

CHAPTER VI

THE POST COLD WAR INDO-AMERICAN ENCOUNTER OVER KASHMIR AND THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

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The Kashmir conflict has had a powerful impact on the relationship of both India and Pakistan with the United States. The conflict has had equally broad impact on a whole range of long-term US policy efforts in the region, including nuclear non-proliferation, promotion of economic development, and the protection of human rights. It has constantly threatened to escalate into full-scale war that could force the unwilling involvement of the United States¹.

The US involvement in the region during most of the post world war II era was largely derivative of the global strategic struggle between the superpowers. The end of the Cold war, seen from either New Delhi or Islamabad, thus seemed for more likely to reduce than to increase US involvement in the region². With the end of the cold war, Washington has been faced with the task of designing an approach to Kashmir that takes into account both of its own diminished interest in the South Asian region and at the same time of the need to find

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1. Robert G. Wirsing. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (Rupa & Co., 1995), p. 237.
 2. Ibid., p. 238.

the middle ground among the politically very prickly issues of which the Kashmir dispute is made¹. The insistence that India and Pakistan must themselves initiate the process of detente between them was clearly consistent with Washington's diminished interest. As expressed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia John Malott in an informal address at the India International Centre, New Delhi in May 1993, the US position was governed by three basic principles. First, the US considered all of Kashmir to be disputed territory, on both sides of the line of control; secondly this was an issue to be settled peacefully by India and Pakistan, taking the views of Kashmiris, both Muslim and non-Muslims into account. Thirdly, the United States offered to be helpful in this process, if that was desired by both sides². US formulation of a stand towards the Kashmir problem has meant tightrope walking for Washington. Official US government characterizations of the problem in Kashmir have consistently sought to portray it in terms inclusive both of the terrorist element and of human rights violations and in that way to

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1. Robert G. Wirsing. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (Rupa & Co., 1995), p. 242.
 2. US Information Service (New Delhi), Official Text. "Speech by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, John R. Malott", India International Centre, 19 May 1993.

strike a balance in criticism of Pakistan and India¹. In congressional testimony at the end of April 1993 John Malott declared that Washington's fundamental objectives in South Asia embraced both an end to terrorism and strengthening of human rights. "In Jammu and Kashmir", he explained, "militants have launched an insurgency, and are resorting to terrorist attacks, Indian security forces commit human rights abuses, and the political dialogue between Kashmiris and Government of India remains stalled. We believe that outside support for the militants and the cycle of violence between the militants and government security forces must end. In addition India should safeguard human rights fully, grant genuine access to Kashmir for international human rights groups, and pursue a meaningful political dialogue with the Kashmiris ... We have been particularly concerned about continuing reports of official Pakistani support for militants who commit acts of terrorism in India. We are keeping this situation under active continuous review, and have raised this issue continuously with the Pakistani government at the highest level"².

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1. Robert G. Wirsing. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (Rupa & Co., 1995), p. 244.
 2. Official Text, Statement of John R. Malott, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 28, 1993.

The US admonishment of India on the question of human rights as outlined in John Malott's speech at India International Centre in May 1993 was not taken kindly by India. An official spokesman responding to John Malott's comments said that "we do not want to be in a position of receiving either advice or exhortation from any country as India's commitment to human rights is second to none"¹. The spokesman further pointed out that allegations of human rights violations in respect of certain specific cases in Jammu and Kashmir where a proxy war was being waged had occurred in extremely abnormal circumstances. India did not condone those excesses and had taken necessary action against the guilty². Not only that, the editorial in The Times of India stated "India's human rights situation in Kashmir is sound at least to the extent that its media, unlike those in closed societies, reports freely and frequently on abuses of human rights by the security forces"³. The editorial further pointed out that apart from the need to assuage fears voiced in the US Congress, it was in country's own interest to curb abuses by allowing, among other things, human rights groups, both Indian

1. The Times of India, Lucknow, 21st May, 1993.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

and international to gain access to their counterparts in the valley¹.

However, Washington's over emphasis on human rights smacks of bias. Towards the end of 1992, the Deptt. of State seemed on the brink of designating Pakistan a sponsor of international terrorism. Addition to that list would have been costly for Pakistan. Countries on it are barred from getting American aid and from purchasing US-made weapons, trade benefits are withdrawn, and access to international lending institutions is curtailed². However, at the end of April 1993, the State Deptt's annual report 'Patterns of Global Terrorism' made little mention of Pakistan³. And in mid-July Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced the US govt's decision to remove Pakistan from the list of suspected terrorist states⁴. In the light of all these developments, when the US is adopting a soft stand towards Pakistan, what locus standi Washington has to intimidate New Delhi with the big stick of human rights. The adoption by the US government of a punitive policy toward India over human rights will not yield the

1. The Times of India, Lucknow, May 21st, 1993.

2. Robert G. Wirsing. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (Rupa & Co., 1995), p. 243.

3. Steven A. Holmes, "US Says Terrorist Attacks Dropped Sharply in 1992", The New York Times, 1 May 1993, p. 4.

4. Robert G. Wirsing. India, op. cit., p. 243.

desired results. On the contrary, it might well have consequences that are better avoided. One of these would be to place in even greater jeopardy than now the possibility that the United States could ever play a mediatory role in the Kashmir dispute¹. The Third world in general and India in particular takes strong objection to the US attitude of arrogating to itself the role of global human rights enforcement agency. The US has appointed itself as the sole arbiter of human rights standards and enforcement. This task should be performed by UN and its human rights agencies should be democratised². Not only this, the US is also guilty of selectively implementing human rights. The self-righteous hectoring and often motivated concern for human rights by western governments and human rights groups provide a shield to terrorism and subversion in many lands struggling to maintain their unity and integrity³.

It seems that Washington's policy towards Kashmir is an exploratory exercise wherein the US adopts a flexible approach and tries to ascertain the direction of thinking of New Delhi

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1. Robert G. Wirsing. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (Rupa & Co., 1995), p. 246.
 2. Inder Malhotra. Human Rights and Wrongs. US Mood and Vienna Meet. The Times of India, June 11, 1993.
 3. Ibid.

by alternating a seemingly anti India approach with a softening in its stand. This moderation in approach was evident in June 1993 when deputy secretary of state John Malott reaffirmed US support for the Simla Agreement and acknowledged that any Kashmiri prepared for a dialogue with India becomes a target of the terrorists¹. Addressing a symposium on India's future, and the United States', Malott said that while getting signatures of India and Pakistan on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remained a US goal, the immediate task was reduction of tensions between them². This symposium afforded an opportunity to Indian Ambassador Siddharta Shankar Ray to highlight the fact that it was Pakistan, not India, that was guilty of ethnic cleansing³. The symposium also witnessed a retraction by Patti Grossman of Asia watch, an India-baiter, of her serious charge, that it was government policy to have the Indian security forces commit mass rape, custodial killings, and other atrocities⁴. Meanwhile Mr. Ray stressed that a secular state like India can never let a certain part of the country secede because there was a Muslim majority. Besides Kashmir, there were also three

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1. The Times of India, Lucknow, June 12, 1993.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

districts in West Bengal with Muslim majorities. Once this principle of secession by a religious minority was permitted, there would be forty Bosnias in India, he said¹.

Another positive development, meanwhile, was the defeat of the move to deny US aid to India by linking it with human rights abuses. Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 9, 1993 rejected a motion calling for the linking of US developmental aid to India to improvements in human rights conditions². Though committee members expressed concern over the human rights situation in Kashmir and Punjab, a majority felt that withholding the US developmental aid was not the solution. Mr. Garry Ackerman, chairman of the subcommittee on foreign affairs led members in rejecting Mr. Dan Burton's proposal for denying aid to India, saying, "we must continue to have a relationship with this very important power". He feared that the amendment "would seriously disrupt our bilateral relationship with a major power, without in any way answering our human rights concerns"³.

Challenging Mr. Burton's proposal, Mr. Ackerman said withholding aid from India would not hurt the security forces

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1. The Times of India, Lucknow, June 12, 1993.
 2. Ibid., June 10, 1993.
 3. Ibid.

but the poorest of the poor. He pointed out that even human rights groups opposed the linking of developmental aid to human rights abuses. He said developmental aid was vital for a nation like India which was battling many social problems on many fronts. He also wondered if it was appropriate to walk into another democracy and dictate what laws should be repealed¹.

The Burton amendment was also challenged by Congressman Manzullo who said that with economic liberalisation India was making significant progress and a time would come when India would not even require foreign aid. Mr. Manzullo further opined that it was not appropriate for one democratic nation to take such measures against another². Mr. Benjamin Gilman of New York who was also among those to oppose the Amendment, said the United States could not single out the Indian government in the face of the violence committed by the militants³.

India is firmly opposed to the doctrine of foreign aid being made dependent on a country's performance on human rights since a country which does not need foreign aid would

1. The Times of India, Lucknow, June 10, 1993.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

then be free to violate human rights as flagrantly as it liked. But on the basic question of the concept of human rights, the Indian view coincides with that of the industrialised countries: that human rights are those that are defined in the UN universal declaration of human rights¹ and concomitant covenants. In December 1991 when the Chinese Prime Minister Mr. Li Peng paid an official visit to New Delhi, the Chinese tried hard to secure Indian concurrence to their philosophy of human rights. With all goodwill for China, the Indian delegation politely declined².

In the beginning the US policy on Kashmir was even handed. This was due to the leadership of one of America's best secretaries of State Gen. George C. Marshall. In fact Marshall politely demurred from supporting the British initiatives to establish a UN Trusteeship over the territory because, as he put it in a telegram to the US Permanent Representative Warren Austin on Feb. 20, 1948, "we believe it highly doubtful that GOI will acquiesce in or assist in implementation of the British plan"³. A day earlier, US

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1. The U.N. Declaration of Human Rights dated Dec. 10, 1948.
 2. Inder Malhotra. Human Rights and Wrongs. US Mood and Vienna Meet. The Times of India, June 11, 1993.
 3. Manoj Joshi. 'Denying the Obvious'. The Times of India, Lucknow, Oct. 30, 1993.

officials meeting their British counterparts in New York noted that "they found it difficult to deny the legal validity of Kashmir's accession to India. Eventually they persuaded their British counterparts to agree with the US point of view that for the time, at any rate, India had legal jurisdiction over Kashmir"¹. This point was reiterated in a telegram by Gen. Marshall to the US Embassy in Delhi on March 4, where he noted "GOP² must recognise that SC³ cannot impose settlement under Chapter VI of the UN Charter but can only make recommendations to parties. Such recommendations must necessarily be made in the light of India's present legal jurisdiction over Kashmir". The US policy stressed the need to evolve a fair settlement acceptable to both parties⁴.

In the ensuing years the Kashmir dispute got lost in the tangled skein of the cold war. An elected constituent Assembly of 1951 agreed 'to link the state to the Indian Union via Article 370 of the Indian Constitution'⁵. The US position had by now changed. As of 1950, the US began to take the view that

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1. Manoj Joshi. 'Denying the Obvious'. The Times of India, Lucknow, Oct. 30, 1993.
 2. Government of Pakistan.
 3. Security Council.
 4. Manoj Joshi. 'Denying the Obvious'. The Times of India, Lucknow, Oct. 30, 1993.
 5. Ibid.

execution of an Instrument of Accession by the Maharaja in October could not finally accomplish the accession of Kashmir to either Dominion in view of the circumstances prevailing at that time. The US position became that it was only the will of the people that could decide the final status of Kashmir¹.

The US sided with Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Nevertheless, they accepted the Simla Agreement of 1972 through which both India and Pakistan agreed to abjure the use of force to resolve the dispute and settle it through bilateral negotiations². In the cloud of confusion few questions have been raised about the validity of Pakistani claim on Kashmir. The claim is not based on the Indian Independence Act of 1947 or the Government of India Act of 1935. It is not based on ethnicity or history. The only claim is on the basis that 77% of the state is Muslim³. To give the dispute a locus standi, tribals, and later Pakistani regulars invaded the State in 1947 and occupied parts of it. In 1965 Pakistani guerrillas attempted to stoke a rebellion in the valley. Only in 1990, following Indian incompetence, Pakistan was able to stoke an armed rebellion in violation of the Simla

1. Manoj Joshi. 'Denying the Obvious'. The Times of India, Lucknow, Oct. 30, 1993.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

Agreement¹.

Early in 1993, the US Deputy Asst. Secretary of State, Mr. John Malott, told his Indian interlocutors that the US recognised the Kashmiri people as a third party to the dispute². This creative interpretation was carried one step forward by Ms Robin Raphel, the official in charge of South Asian affairs in the state department. She called into question the status of Kashmir and doubted the validity of the instrument of accession signed between Lord Mountbatton and Maharaja Hari Singh on Oct. 26, 1947³. The editorial of the Times of India strongly condemned the US stand in the following words "Ms Raphel can well argue that she has merely reiterated Washington's long-standing view on the subject which has always been that the instrument of accession did not definitely settle the issue of Kashmir's status and that legal considerations alone - i.e. without reference to the freely expressed will of the Kashmiri people - cannot be the basis of a solution to the dispute. But this argument can only be interpreted in New Delhi as a provocation"⁴.

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1. Manoj Joshi. 'Denying the Obvious'. The Times of India, Lucknow, Oct. 30, 1993.
 2. Ibid.
 3. The Times of India, Lucknow, Nov. 1, 1993.
 4. Ibid.

As far as India is concerned, any attempt to reopen the legal and political basis of Kashmir's accession would be tantamount to challenging the country's integrity. The presence of Kashmir in the Indian federation is the surest guarantee of the secular order which holds this country of diverse faiths and belief in one piece. It is true that successive governments in New Delhi and Srinagar have, through their various acts of omission and commission brought the state to its present plight. But this cannot obscure the fact that Kashmir's accession was and remains a vivid symbol of independent India's rejection of a theocratic state and by the same token of the pernicious two nation theory. For this very reason Ms Raphael's statement, like President Clinton's reference to Kashmir in his address to the United Nations, is bound to be seen in New Delhi as an extremely dangerous one¹.

There is no case for giving any benefit of doubt to the US in regard to Robin Raphael's statement in the face of blatantly unfriendly statement by a supposedly long-time India's ally in the US Congress, Mr. Stephen Solarz, who sent shock waves in the Indian establishment when he sought to speculate the impact of Kashmir's secession from the Indian

1. The Times of India, Lucknow, Nov. 1, 1993.

Union. Raising the hypothetical question at the centre for Strategic and International studies, Mr. Solarz wanted to know from visiting Indian parliamentarians the impact of Kashmir secession on the rest of India¹. Would India disintegrate like the former Soviet Union? Or would India suffer violent clashes like the former Yugoslavia, Stephen Solarz wondered while repeatedly stressing that his query was purely hypothetical. He further noted that he had heard conflicting accounts that India could either withstand Kashmir's secession, or disintegrate².

That Ms. Robin Raphel's statement was not an off-the-cuff remark but had the approval of the state deptt. is proved by the clarification issued by the same. The official spokesman did not characterise the assistant secretary's remarks as a 'mis-speak', the diplomatic term it uses to disassociate itself from embarrassing remarks made by top officials or politicians. In this case, the clarification reaffirmed the original remarks. The spokesman said that Ms. Raphel was only reiterating stated policy³. Needless to say Robin Raphel's statements on Kashmir infuriated India. The hurt was

1. The Times of India, Lucknow, Oct. 30, 1993.

2. Ibid.

3. J.N.Parimoo. 'Implications of US Stand on Kashmir'. The Times of India, Lucknow, Nov. 6, 1993.

accentuated by the US President's own letters to American Congressmen, and even to a self-confessed propagandist of Kashmiri terrorists and secessionists¹. A number of important Americans both in the administration and on the Capital Hill deplored Ms. Raphel's performance but none of them has put the criticism on record or otherwise made it public². Even America's realisation that India was a big emerging market, and that India was sincerely interested in improving relations with the US did not help³.

The basic problem in the resolution of Kashmir dispute is the failure of both India and Pakistan to liberate it from the flawed historical interpretations and linkages and view the entire problem afresh in the light of existing ground situation. India has always treated kashmir as an emotional issue, and has tended to become paranoid about those extraneous suggestions on Kashmir, specially Washington's, which have been at variance from New Delhi's own line of thinking leading it to interpret all such external gestures as

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1. Inder Malhotra. 'Indo-US Relations: A Mixed Bag'. World Focus, Nov-Dec. 1994, p. 42.
 2. Inder Malhotra. 'Political Commentary, A worsening, Widening Mess'. The Times of India, Lucknow, Nov. 11, 1993.
 3. Inder Malhotra. 'Indo-US Relations: A Mixed Bag'. World Focus, Nov-Dec. 1994, p. 42.

attempts to undermine its security and integrity. Pakistan on its part finds in Kashmir an opportunity to avenge the loss of East Pakistan. Moreover, its compulsions of domestic politics prevents Islamabad to work out a political settlement with New Delhi lest the ruling elite in Pakistan be charged with soft pedalling on the Kashmir problem.

In such a complex scenario it becomes essential for the US to tread carefully in evolving a South Asian policy so that its actions are not misinterpreted either by India or Pakistan. In moving toward closer relations with India, the United States should seek to preserve constructive relations with Pakistan by emphasizing the economic dimensions of the relationship that had been subordinated during the cold war¹. American policies in all spheres should be designed to avoid aggravating tensions between the two countries. American policy on the Kashmir issue should continue to promote bilateral Indo-Pakistan negotiations within the framework of the Simla Agreement. This would not preclude American support for some form of United Nations involvement, provided that both parties join in inviting a UN role and that such a role

1. Selig S. Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp. 'India & America After the Cold War'. Report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on US-Indian Relations In A Changing International Environment, p. 33.

is not predicated on adherence to past UN resolutions on Kashmir¹.

The United States should press India to seek a political settlement in Kashmir and urge upon it higher priority to the observance of basic human rights. But this is best done in full sight of the entire context of human rights violations and it should be done with the expectation that the Indian government will give highest priority to its territorial integrity, to the security of its frontiers².

The separatist problem in Kashmir is only one part and a relatively small one of the entire canvass of Indo-US relations. Therefore, the US policy toward India should not be made dependent to any great extent upon New Delhi's adoption of a 'gentler' strategy in Kashmir than has thus far been pursued³.

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1. Selig S. Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp. 'India & America After the Cold War'. Report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on US-Indian Relations In A Changing International Environment, p. 34.
 2. Robert G. Wirsing. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (Rupa & co., 1995), p. 247.
 3. Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

THE EPILOGUE

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Half-century of relations between India and United States have been uneven - on occasion friendly, sometimes hostile, but more often just estranged. Fifty years of direct dealings between the United States and India have raised two big questions about their relationship. One is, why have two countries with so many similarities in their political values, and systems, their declared goals of world peace, stability and prosperity, and their pluralistic, basically tolerant societies, generated so much friction and so little substance in their relationship¹. The other is, how is it that two countries on opposite sides of the globe, with dissimilar histories, traditions, peoples, and religions, at very different stages of national economic and political development, and occupying widely separate rungs in the hierarchy of world power, have found it possible to cooperate in a friendly and non-exploitative manner in several areas of public international affairs from time to time².

The root cause of Indo-US disagreement can be found in

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1. Surjit Mansingh. 'The United States and India', World Focus, June 1996, p. 15.
 2. Ibid.

the clash over national security issues of major importance to each country. For India the principal stumbling block has been the US-Pakistan relationship. In arming and aligning itself with Pakistan, the United States linked arms with the country which independent India considered its principal security threat¹. For the United States, the decisive problem was India's attitude towards the erstwhile Soviet Union. In establishing the policy of non-alignment under Nehru, India annoyed the United States by refusing to agree with America's perception of the Soviet threat. Under Mrs. Gandhi India went much further, establishing close security and political ties with Moscow, making common cause with the nation which the United States regarded as the major threat to its security and to global peace and security².

New Delhi's refusal to be drawn into the cold war and to back the policy of containment, politely declining the US invitation to join the SEATO and CENTO resulted in the US-Pak alliance, which later on became a permanent stumbling block preventing the healthy growth of Indo-US relations³. The US

1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p. 448.

2. Ibid.

3. A.P. Venkateswaran. 'New paradigms in Indo-US Relations'. *World Focus*, Nov-Dec. 1991, p. 41.

perception that India had entered the Soviet orbit ensured that no meaningful political relationship could be established between the two countries. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, which followed in 1971, proved to be the last straw¹. Thus from the very beginning there was an obvious divergence between American and Indian strategic perspectives that was reinforced by their different international agendas - anti communism and its many corollaries including free enterprise contrasting with anti-colonialism and equally numerous corollaries including state control of the economy².

The divergence of strategic perspective between India and the US had profound effects after the Bangladesh Liberation war of 1971, and Sino-US rapprochement in 1972. India was seldom considered sufficiently important in itself to be cultivated, or have its expressed concerns accommodated by the US; the US came to embody deep-seated insecurities (i.e. foreign hand bogey) in the minds of many Indian decision-makers, and opinion-makers³. Both tendencies were exacerbated

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1. A.P. Venkateswaran. 'New paradigms in Indo-US Relations'. World Focus, Nov-Dec. 1991, p. 41.
 2. Surjit Mansingh. 'The United States and India', World Focus, June 1996, p. 15.
 3. Ibid.

during the new cold war of the 1980s when the Reagan administration took a hard line toward all developing countries advocating New International Economic Order, and supported the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan by methods, including arms aid to Pakistan, that impacted severely on India's security¹. The resulting mould of thought, and behaviour in Washington and New Delhi-ranging from indifference to animosity - was allowed to harden into an illusion of permanence persisting even after the cold war was over².

However, there have been some positive facets too of Indo-US relations. For India, the United States has had great economic importance for two decades, from 1951 until 1971, as the major donor of bilateral aid and, more recently, as a result of US influence over the decisions of international financial institutions³. The United States has become India's largest trading partner, and an important source of investment and technology, even though India has played only a minor role in the US external commerce⁴.

The end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet

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1. Surjit Mansingh. 'The United States and India', World Focus, June 1996, pp. 15,16.
 2. Ibid., p. 16.
 3. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), p. 448.
 4. Ibid.

Union opened the way for significant changes in the Indo-American relations. The 1991 Gulf war underlined the impact of the post-cold war geopolitical realignments on the relationship. In contrast to past world crises in which the two countries have clashed, India supported the UN embargo against Iraq, refrained from criticizing the deployment of US forces in Saudi Arabia, and permitted over flights, and refuelling by US combat aircraft enroute to the Gulf until the closing stages of the war¹. Until recently, the dominant American view has been that India is of marginal importance to the United States despite their shared commitment to democratic values. In this perspective, Indian development problems are so enormous that friendship can only be a one-way street and India will remain too poor and too unstable to be more than a military nuisance². This deeply rooted image of India as a 'basket case' of no importance to the United States is increasingly obsolete. Given the growing convergence of Indian and American geopolitical interests, the growth of Indian military power could prove advantageous to US interests

1. Selig S. Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp. 'India and America After The Cold War'. Report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on US-Indian Relations in a Changing International Environment, p. 8.

2. Ibid., p. 25.

in the context of an overall improvement in Indo-American relations¹. India's foreign policy has been steadily converging with US interests as a result of the end of the bipolar era. Both the countries share similar concerns with respect to international terrorism, the spread of AIDs, religious fundamentalism, illegal drug trafficking, support for human rights and unrestricted navigation in the Indian Ocean and the adjoining Persian Gulf region².

However, despite all the past Indo-US economic relationship and the initiation of economic liberalization by New Delhi coinciding with the end of cold war and the collapse of Soviet Union, the political issues generating friction continue to persist. Most of the political irritants between India and the US are legacies of the cold war - Kashmir, the American obsession with nuclear and missile proliferation and restrictions on technology transfers³. Washington's policies on these issues continue to be based on cold war logic. It is very difficult for one country to give up the mind-set and

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1. Selig S. Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp. 'India and America After The Cold War'. Report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on US-Indian Relations in a Changing International Environment, p. 19.
 2. Ibid., p. 9.
 3. K. Subrahmanyam. 'Role of The Market. New Factor in Indo-US Ties'. The Times of India, Oct. 11, 1994.

conditioning of over four decades in a short period of time¹. Since the end of cold war came about suddenly and unexpectedly with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has not been sufficient time for either the US or India to adjust itself to the changes and to initiate necessary revisions in policies. Having been used to a client relationship with Pakistan for 40 years, it is not easy for the US bureaucracy to make a 180 degree switch in a short span of time².

Another irritant in the Indo-US relations has been the past US tendency to treat China as more important than India. India sees itself as an emerging great power, with the world as its stage, while the United States has viewed India as a regional power. Like China, India, with one-sixth of world's population, has a "Middle Kingdom" ethos. Thus US policies perceived as giving greater importance to China than to India, or as bracketing India with Pakistan, have been a persistent source of discord³.

Theoretically the end of cold war should have exercised

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1. K. Subrahmanyam. 'Role of The Market New Factor In Indo-US Ties'. The Times of India, Oct. 11, 1994.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Selig S. Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp. 'India and America After The Cold War'. Report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on US-Indian Relations in a Changing International Environment, p. 7.

positive influence on the Indo-US relations. The Soviet Union disintegrated, India liberalised its economy, the need for Washington to pursue containment policy was absent - all these developments offered a new point of departure. The biggest factor generating hope for a better future Indo-US relations was the invocation of Pressler Amendment against Pakistan resulting in the suspension of arms flow from Washington to Islamabad. It appeared that Indo-US relations would no-longer be hostage to US-Pakistan and Indo-Soviet relations. However, all such hopes were dashed and the myth that the US had abandoned pro-Pakistan tilt was shattered when Washington adopted a one time waiver to the withheld arms supply to Islamabad through the passage of Brown Amendment. This act revealed the presence of very strong anti-Indian biases in the American political establishment the roots of which lie partially in India's foreign policy independence during the cold war and partially in the public relations impact achieved by pro-Khalistanis and groups that take Pakistan's side on Kashmir¹. Moreover the biggest threat to India from this allegedly 'one-time' arms transfer to Pakistan is that it is not a 'one time' arms supply, but a tactical means of breaking

1. Harold A. Gould. 'Back from the Future. Aftermath of the Brown Amendment. The Times of India, Nov. 4, 1995.

the psychological barrier to delegitimising the Pressler Amendment so that the arms relationship with Pakistan can be resumed on an increasing scale in subsequent fiscal years¹.

The anti-India bias of the US on Kashmir was again proved when Robin Raphel questioned the validity of Kashmir's accession to India and referred to Kashmir as a disputed territory. The old cry for self-determination was in a way revived by proposing tripartite talks between India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir to settle the dispute. Pakistan was taken off the watch list for being declared a terrorist state. Violation of human rights in Kashmir was made into a major issue²

One of the most difficult issues between India and United States in the 1990s is the nuclear question. With both India and Pakistan now acknowledged as nuclear weapon capable countries, the proliferation issue and the related problem of missile capability are certain to remain major bilateral preoccupations. This development has made conflict-avoidance between India and Pakistan a key US regional security interest

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1. Harold A. Gould. 'Back from the Future. Aftermath of the Brown Amendment. The Times of India, Nov. 4, 1995.
 2. Lt. Gen. S.K. Sinha. 'The Ghost of Dulles'. The Hindustan Times, Nov. 24, 1995.

in South Asia¹. The present goal of American non-proliferation policy towards South Asia therefore is to "cap, then overtime reduce, and finally eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery"² in India and Pakistan. Specifically, it is pressing them to join a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and an international agreement banning the manufacture of fissile materials for military purposes³. However, US credentials in connection with non-proliferation policy is suspect. As C. Raja Mohan writes "Washington's past non-proliferation record in the subcontinent, in particular its acquiescence in Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme in the 1980s tends to rob Washington of some of its credibility in sounding high and mighty about non-proliferation".⁴ C. Raja Mohan further writes "In its pursuit of non-proliferation objectives, the United States has not paid enough attention to Indian sensitivities or interests on the nuclear question, and the limits imposed by the

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1. Dennis Kux. *Estranged Democracies* (Sage Publications), p.452.
 2. USIS Official Text, *Progress Toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia*, p. 3.
 3. USIS Official Text, US Ambassador Frank G. Wisner presents Credentials, Aug. 2, 1994.
 4. C. Raja Mohan. *Indo-US Cooperation in Arms Control in Francine R. Frankel ed. Bridging the Non-Proliferation Divide. The United States & India* (Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd.), p. 357.

domestic political debate on a radical reorientation of India's nuclear policy"¹. Washington's counter-proliferation policy of trying vigorously to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear and missile capability through denial of dual-use technology transfers and increasingly strict international regimes of control is proving to be a major obstacle in the Indo-US rapprochement².

However, despite the deadlock on account of several intractable problems, Indo-US bilateral relations have made sufficient progress in the 1990s. Even before the cold war ended, Washington tried to cultivate "regional influentials" including India. Special study groups in high level think tanks - such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Asia Society, and the Washington Council on Non-Proliferation - made recommendations to the US government to pay more attention to India and its concerns, to allow India's 'natural weight' to prevail and not regard its potential power as dangerous, and, among other things, to raise the number of

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1. C. Raja Mohan. Indo-US Cooperation in Arms Control in Francine R. Frankel ed. Bridging the Non-Proliferation Divide. The United States & India (Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd.), p. 357.
 2. Surjit Mansingh. The United States and India, World Focus, June 1996, p. 16.

high level exchanges¹. All Indian governments gave high priority to relations with the US, more so after India decided on economic reforms and Soviet Union disintegrated².

An increase in the Indo-US economic and commercial relations is very much visible. The US is India's largest trading partner and the single largest investor, with a quantum leap in volume and value taking place through the early 1990s³. The Indo-US Commercial Alliance of 1995 provides an institutional framework for more joint ventures between private companies in all fields, including infrastructure ones of power and telecommunication. Cooperation through joint research in science and technology is also much greater, closer, and on more sophisticated topics than publicised differences of patent laws and intellectual property rights would lead one to believe⁴. Indian non-governmental and governmental efforts to protect the environment, tap renewable sources of energy, and engage in non-exploitative rural development also have found supporters in the United States⁵.

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1. Surjit Mansingh. The United States and India, World Focus, June 1996, p. 16.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid., p. 17.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

The first steps toward the Indo-US defence cooperation were initiated by the "Kicklighter proposals" in 1991 and consolidated with the US Defence Secretary Perry's visit to India in Jan. 1995¹. A programme of mutual visits between strategic institutes, military dignitaries and officers of the armed forces in war colleges of specific programmes, and combined training exercises for air and naval contingents was started at modest levels. The Malabar I and Malabar II joint naval exercises held in May 1995 and March 1996 were more sophisticated as US nuclear submarines also participated².

It is difficult to imagine a situation wherein differences on security issues between the two countries can be obliterated altogether, more so in the case of the United States and India when the latter happens to be a country which has always refused to become a camp follower of any global power. However, the attraction and importance which India is assuming as a big market for industrialised countries after undertaking economic liberalisation provides to New Delhi a bargaining chip which can be used to prevail upon the decision-makers in the United States. Such a situation would

1. Surjit Mansingh. The United States and India, World Focus, June 1996, p. 16.

2. Ibid.

enable New Delhi to influence policy making in Washington in a manner which leads to narrowing down of political and security-strategic differences and adoption of policies by Washington which are relatively more consistent with India's interest. As V.P. Dutt observes "Economic and political relationship will act and react on each other In an emerging situation in which every inch of the economic ground would be hard fought for among the major economic players, the leverage exercised by countries like India must be a part of the matrix that should shape our decisions in regard to the issues in Indo-US relations"¹.

The first half century of relations between the United States and India has been disappointing. The clash of interest that began during World War II, when Indians and American differed on basic priorities continued through the more than forty years of the cold war. The two countries found themselves on opposite sides of major foreign and security policy issues despite their common adherence to the democratic system². Even the end of cold war could not make it possible for New Delhi and Washington to take advantage of the

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1. V.P.Dutt. 'Indo-US Ties. The right perspective'. The Hindustan Times, Feb. 1, 1995.
 2. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), p.453.

historical opportunity to improve their relations to the desired extent. The basic flaw in the Indo-US conduct of bilateral relations is the failure of both to liberate themselves from the hangover of the past and start writing their relations afresh on a clean state. This is compounded by the inability to find some middle path as a compromise to the differing security perceptions. The US appears to be too ardent a practitioner of realism at the cost of humanitarian considerations, and India clothes all its policies in the rhetoric of idealism. The intransigence has therefore resulted in the failure to achieve a major breakthrough in bilateral issues related to security matters despite the existence of large amount of goodwill and extensive relations in the cultural and economic spheres. Just as Americans need to realise that the voice of New Delhi is no longer Krishna Menon, or Indira Gandhi, Indians need to realize that John Foster Dulles and Richard Nixon no longer direct the US foreign policy¹. If India makes US-bashing a national political pastime, progress toward better relations will probably be impossible. If Washington functionaries continue

 1. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), p.451.

to have an almost knee-jerk negative attitude of distrust toward India, it will be difficult to advance relations¹.

It would be in India's interest if it recapitulates some of the important principles of the conduct of international relations. The first point to be kept in mind is that foreign and defence policy decisions of states are primarily responsive to their own perceptions of their interests. Second, that such decisions are not subject to emotional considerations. Third, that if a policy decision of a country, in this case that of the United States, negatively affects India's interests, it does not necessarily mean that that state is antagonistic towards India². Apart from these factors it would also serve India better if it undertakes measures to improve its foreign policy planning mechanism. The same in US appears to be more institutionalised, and the policies are the result of well carried out researches and inputs from different governmental structures. This is probably the reason why the US diplomacy often scores over ours. Despite the seemingly confident utterances of our leaders in connection with our foreign policy options, we have succumbed under

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1. Dennis Kux. Estranged Democracies (Sage Publications), p.451.
 2. J.N. Dixit. 'India has been pulled up short'. The Hindustan Times, Nov. 5, 1995.

pressure when we should have stood firm. Success in strengthening our foreign policy planning institutions will mean tiding over the inconsistencies of our foreign policy which will result in framing of more balanced policies enabling India to answer the US allegations more confidently and meaningfully.

Only a naive would assume that all the bilateral issues can be resolved to the complete satisfaction of both the parties. In conclusion, we agree with the statement of Inder Malhotra: "yet there is enough meeting ground between New Delhi and Washington, and enough commonality of interests to enable them to cooperate to great mutual advantage. The two countries can do a world of good to themselves and others where they agree. And where they disagree, they can do so without being disagreeable"¹.

1. Inder Malhotra. 'Indo-US Relations'. World Focus, Nov-Dec. 1994.

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